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ABSTRACT 
 
EFFECT OF CONTEXT AND PROCESS ON SUCCESS OF INTERNATIONAL 
MEDIATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF MEDIATION EFFORTS IN CYPRUS 
AND NORTHERN IRELAND CONFLICTS 
 
ONUR ŞEN 
 
Conflict Analysis and Resolution MA Thesis, 2010 
Dr. Doğa Ulaş Eralp  
 
Keywords: International Mediation, Determinants of Success, Conflict in Cyprus, Conflict in 
Northern Ireland, Contingency Model of Mediation, Kofi Annan, George Mitchell 
 
The aim of the thesis is to explore the determinants of success in international 
mediation. While trying to answer the question of “what determinants affected the success or 
failure of international mediation in Cyprus and Northern Ireland conflicts?” a comparative 
case study method was used. George Mitchell’s mediation effort in Northern Ireland as a 
success and Kofi Annan’s mediation effort in Cyprus as a failure were compared under the 
Contingency Model of Mediation. Eight hypotheses which were put forward by Jacob 
Bercovitch and his colleagues after their quantitative study of 284 international mediation 
attempts were tested on these two cases.  
While making this comparative case study research, a triangulated data collection 
method was used. Firstly, various forms of documentary information were analyzed which 
include academic articles, evaluations of the same topic, books written on the topic. Secondly, 
focused interviews were conducted with NGO representatives, academics, policy makers and 
other experts on the issues. Lastly, two field trips were made to Cyprus and Northern Ireland 
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during which direct observations were made for a better understanding of historical and 
behavioral factors affecting the process. 
The findings show that both of the cases meet the highest possibility of success only 
on three of the variables (out of eight) which are regime types, issues and strategies of the 
mediator. According to this conclusion, theoretically both of the mediation attempts are 
expected to be unsuccessful. However, in reality, one of them was successful while the other 
was not. Therefore, the determinants of success put forward by Bercovitch were not enough to 
explain the success of George Mitchell and failure of Kofi Annan. In last part of the thesis, 
additional determinants which were potentially affected the outcome of the mediation 
attempts in these two cases were listed. More research is needed to understand whether or not 
these additional determinants are effective on outcome of other international mediation 
efforts.  
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ÖZET 
İÇERİK VE SÜRECİN ULUSLARARASI ARABULUCULUĞUN BAŞARISI 
ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİ: KIBRIS VE KUZEY İRLANDA’DAKİ ARABULUCULUK 
GİRİŞİMLERİNİN KARŞILAŞTIRMASI 
 
ONUR ŞEN 
 
Uyuşmazlık Analizi ve Çözümü Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2010 
Dr. Doğa Ulaş Eralp 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Uluslararası Arabuluculuk, Başarıyı Belirleyici Faktörler, Kıbrıs 
Uyuşmazlığı, Kuzey İrlanda Uyuşmazlığı, Arabuluculuk Koşullu Modeli, Kofi Annan, 
George Mitchell 
 
Bu tezin amacı uluslararası arabuluculuğun başarısına etki eden faktörleri 
araştırmaktır. “Kıbrıs ve Kuzey İrlanda uyuşmazlıklarındaki uluslararası arabuluculuğun 
başarısını etkileyen faktörler nelerdir?” sorusuna cevap ararken, karşılaştırmalı durum 
çalışması methodu kullanılmıştır. George Mitchell’in Kuzey İrlanda’daki arabuluculuğunun 
başarısı ve Kofi Annan’ın Kıbrıs’taki başarısızlığı Arabuluculuk Koşullu Modeli kapsamında 
incelenmiştir. Jacob Bercovitch ve arkadaşlarının 284 uluslararası arabuluculuk girişimini 
nicel bir şekilde inceleyip ortaya attıkları sekiz hipotez bu iki durum üzerinde test edilmiştir. 
Bu karşılaştırmalı durum araştırmasını yaparken üçlü bir bilgi toplama methodu 
kullanılmıştır. Öncelikle, akademik makaleler, aynı konunu değerlendirmeleri, konu üzerine 
yazılmış kitaplar gibi çeşitli belgeler incelenmiştir. İkinci olarak, Sivil toplum kuruluşları 
temsilcileri, akademisyenler, karar alıcı pozisyondaki kişiler ve konu üzerindeki diğer 
uzmanlarla mülakatlar yapılmıştır. Son olarak da, süreci etkileyen tarihi ve davranışsal 
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faktörleri daha iyi kavrayabilmek için direk gözlem yapmak amacıyla Kıbrıs ve Kuzey 
İrlanda’ya birer saha gezisi düzenlenmiştir. 
Araştırma sonuçlarına göre, her iki durumda siyasal sistem, konular ve arabulucunun 
stratejileri olmak üzere üç faktörlerde (sekiz taneden) en yüksek başarı oranını sağlayan 
grupta yer alıyor. Bu sonuca göre, teorik olarak her iki girişimin de başarısız olması beklenir. 
Halbuki, gerçekte biri başarılıyken diğeri başarısızdır. Sonuç olarak, Bercovitch’in ortaya 
attığı başarıyı etkileyen faktörler, George Mitchell’in başarısını ve Kofi Annan’ın 
başarısızlığını açıklamaya yetmiyor. Tezin son bölümünde, söz konusu iki arabuluculuk 
girişiminin sonucunu muhtemel olarak etkilemiş olan ek faktörler ortaya atılmıştır. Bu ek 
faktörlerin diğer uluslararası arabuluculuk girişimlerinde de etkili olup olmadığını anlamak 
için daha fazla araştırmaya gerek duyulmaktadır.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my family, for everything…  
 
In memory of my brother in law Mahmut Aktaş… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
xi 
 
 
  
xii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
During this long, tiring, time to time depressing but in general fun journey of thesis writing, 
there are some people without whom this thesis would have never become a reality. Here, I 
would like to use this opportunity to show them my appreciation for their help and support. 
Among them, I would like to start with my thesis supervisor Ulaş Doğa Eralp, who not only 
helped me academically but also supported me as friend during this process. I would also like 
to thank Riva Kantowitz, Esra Çuhadar Gürkaynak and Burak Arıkan, having you in my 
defense committee was a privilege. Special thanks to Nimet Beriker and Ayşe Betül Çelik 
who took me as a naive undergraduate student and made me a “master”. 
During the data collection part of my thesis, there were some people and institutions that were 
patient enough to answer my never ending questions and directed me to their networks for 
further interviews. Among them, in Cyprus, I would like to thank to Cyprus International 
University and Umut Özkaleli, Eastern Mediterranean University and Ahmet Sözen, and the 
Management Center. In Northern Ireland, I would like to thank to Mediation Northern 
Ireland, and especially to Andrew McCracken who gave me the opportunity to be an intern at 
their institution. International Conflict Resolution (INCORE), Institute of Conflict Resolution 
(ICR) and Queen’s University of Belfast are other institutions that helped me with my 
interviews.  
My dear friends, Julie Mancuso and Solace Duncan who helped me in editing my thesis 
deserve my thanks here. Another friend who deserves a special thank is Can Özcan, who 
passed through this stressful way with me and supported me sometimes with an article, 
sometimes with a cup of coffee.  
Last, but not least, I want thank my mother and my sisters who have their signatures under 
every success I achieve in my life. 
And my brother in law, Mahmut Aktaş, who passed away during this year...I still feel his 
support for every single initiative I take in my life. 
  
 
 
xiii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION 1 
CHAPTER 1. LITERATURE REVIEW 3 
1.1 Definitions of Mediation 3 
1.2 Contingency Model of Mediation              4 
CHAPTER 2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 15 
2.1 Comparative Case Study Research 15 
2.2 Reasons for Choosing These Cases 16 
2.3 Data Collection Methods              16 
CHAPTER 3. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CAUSES OF CONFLICTS      18 
3.1 History of the Conflict in Cyprus 18 
3.2 History of the Conflict in Northern Ireland           23 
CHAPTER 4. ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT IN CYPRUS 29 
4.1 Context Variables: 29 
4.1.1 Characteristics of Parties  29 
4.1.1.1 Regime Types 29 
4.1.1.2 Relative Power  34 
4.1.1.3 Previous Relations 35 
4.1.2 Nature of Dispute  38 
4.1.2.1. Duration 38 
4.1.2.2 Intensity 39 
4.1.2.3 Issues 39 
4.1.3 The Identity and Characteristics of Mediation  40 
xiv 
 
(Impartiality, Leverage, Status) 
4.2 Process Variable: 41 
4.2.1 Strategies of Mediator  41 
(Communication-Facilitation Strategies, Procedural Strategies, Directive Strategies) 
CHAPTER 5. ANALYSIS OF THE CONFLICT IN NORTHERN IRELAND 42 
5.1 Context Variables: 42 
5.1.1 Characteristics of Parties  42 
5.1.1.1 Regime Types 42 
5.1.1.2 Relative Power  44 
5.1.1.3 Previous Relations 46 
5.1.2 Nature of Dispute  47 
5.1.2.1 Duration 47 
5.1.2.2 Intensity 48 
5.1.2.3 Issues 48 
5.1.3 The Identity and Characteristics of Mediation  49 
(Impartiality, Leverage, Status) 
5.2 Process Variable: 50 
5.2.1 Strategies of Mediator  50 
(Communication-Facilitation Strategies, Procedural Strategies, Directive Strategies) 
CHAPTER 6. CROSS-CASE CONCLUSIONS 51 
 
CONCLUSION 59 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 61 
xv 
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1. Mediation Outcomes: 1945-1989 5 
Table 2. Contingency Model of Mediation 6 
Table 3. Political Parties in Republic of Cyprus 29 
Table 4. Republic of Cyprus, Assembly Election of 27 May 2001 29 
Table 5. Republic of Cyprus, Legislative Election of 21 May 2006 30 
Table 6. Political Parties in Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 31 
Table 7. Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Legislative Elections of 15 Dec. 2003 32 
Table 8. Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Legislative Elections of 20 Feb. 2004 32 
Table 9. Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Legislative Elections of 19 April 2009 33 
Table 10. Armed Forces of Greece and Turkey 35 
Table 11. Political Parties in Northern Ireland 42 
Table 12. Election to the Northern Ireland Assembly, 25 June 1998 42 
Table 13. Election to the Northern Ireland Assembly, 26 November 2003 43 
Table 14. Armed Forces of United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland 45 
Table 15. Deaths in the Troubles by Communities 48 
Table 16. Cross-Case Conclusions 55 
Table 17. Additional Variables 58 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of this research is to explore the determinants of success in international 
mediation. The literature on international mediation has been trying to find a formula to 
explain the outcomes of international mediation efforts. ―What determines the success or 
failure of mediation‖ has been the questions which the scholars in the field constantly asked 
themselves. However, although there is considerable number of studies on this topic, the 
researchers have not found a major theory to explain the outcome of international mediation. 
The complex nature of mediation and specific characteristics of each conflict make it even 
more difficult to find a common pattern between various cases. 
Knowing the need for more focused case studies, I choose to analyze mediation efforts 
of Kofi Annan in Cyprus conflict and George Mitchell in Northern Ireland conflict. I believe 
that an in-depth analysis of these two well-known international mediation attempts will yield 
important results for a better understanding of the determinants of success in international 
mediation. The two cases are very similar in many aspects (such as both being on an 
ethnically divided island, similar number of fatalities, similar time period of conflicts and 
mediation efforts...) with a major difference at the outcome. By looking at a successful and an 
unsuccessful case of international mediation, I will try to explore what determines the success 
or failure of mediation.  
While analyzing the cases, the Contingency Model of Mediation which was proposed 
by Jacob Bercovitch in 1991 was used. The context and process variables he proposed were 
taken as independent variables of the research. The outcome of the international mediation 
was the dependent variable. His hypotheses, which he reached by quantitatively studying 284 
mediation attempts, were tested on Cyprus and Northern Ireland cases. The aim was to 
understand whether these determinants were enough to understand the success of George 
Mitchell and failure of Kofi Annan. 
In doing such a comparative case study research, in order to have triangulated results, 
data was collected from multiple sources. Academic and newspaper articles, books and 
memories of mediators, internet resources were used as documentary information.  Interviews 
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with academics, NGO representatives and some other influential people of the communities 
were conducted. Lastly, two field trips to Northern Ireland and to Cyprus were made for direct 
observations during the data collection process.  
To better understand the necessity of this research and the Contingency Model of 
Mediation, the thesis will start with a literature review on international mediation. Short 
histories of the two conflicts are also necessary before the analysis of the cases. It will be 
followed by separate analysis of the Cyprus and Northern Ireland cases respectively according 
to the hypotheses of Bercovitch. Lastly, cross-case conclusions will be reported and the main 
question of what determined the success and failure of international mediation in Cyprus and 
Northern Ireland will be answered.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
1.1 Definitions of Mediation 
International mediation – “a form of conflict management in which a third party 
assists two or more contending parties to find a solution without resorting to force (Kleiboer, 
1996)‖,  has a longer history in practice. Managing conflicts through intermediaries has a rich 
history in Western and non-Western cultures (Gulliver, 1979). For Bercovitch (1984), 
mediation is almost as common as conflict itself in the international arena where there are 
perennial challenges of escalating conflicts, an anarchical society and the absence of any 
generally accepted rules of the game. Mediation is used in international relations when: “(1) 
disputes are long, drawn out and complex; (2) the disputants’’ own conflict management 
efforts have reached an impasse; (3) neither side is prepared to counterbalance further costs 
or escalation of the dispute; and (4) the disputants are prepared to break their stalemate by 
cooperating with each other and engaging in some communication and contact (Bercovitch, 
1984).  
 
Although it has a much longer history in practice, academic studies on the topic date 
from the last 4 decades, starting with Young (1967), Burton ( 1969), and Stenelo (1972). 
Since then, various definitions of mediation have been put forward by scholars from 
disciplines as diverse as anthropology, law, psychology, political science, sociology and 
others. Some of these definitions are worth mentioning here, such as the one in William 
Zartman’s ―Hurting Stalemate‖. For him mediation occurs “when the conflicting parties are 
neither capable of managing the conflict through a clear victory on the field, or some kind of 
a negotiated solution, nor willing to accept any imposed solution by a third party decision-
making” (1985). Mediation thus can be defined as a political process with no advance 
commitment from the parties to accept the mediator’s ideas (Zartman & Touval 1985). Doob 
defines international mediation as “the efforts of one or more persons to affect one or more 
other persons when the former, the latter or both perceive a problem requiring a resolution” 
(1993, p.1). Mitchell on the other side defines it as “an intermediary activity undertaken by a 
third party with the primary intention of achieving some compromise settlement of issues at 
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stake between the parties, or at least ending disruptive behavior” (1981). Folberg and Taylor 
characterize mediation as “the process which the participants, together with the assistance of 
a neutral person or persons, systematically isolate disputed issues in order to develop 
options, consider alternatives, and reach a unanimous settlement that will accommodate their 
needs” (1984, p.7).  
 
Mediation is considered as a continuous set of related activities involving actors, 
decisions and situations. According to Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille (1991), the nature, 
form and intensity of mediation in a particular dispute is determined by a number of factors, 
including the nature of the dispute, the nature of the mediator and various other cultural and 
contextual variables. So, by putting various definitions of international mediation together, 
their definition of mediation is “...a process of conflict management where disputants seek the 
assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state or organization to 
settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking 
the authority of the law” (Bercovitch, 1986a; Dryzek & Hunter, 1987; Wall. 1981).  
 
Since the beginning of academic work on international mediation, scholars and 
practitioners in the field were occupied with the question of how to make international 
mediation successful. Through qualitative, in-depth case analysis or large-scale quantitative 
comparative research, many scholars have tried to find the golden formula to explain which 
factors contribute to successful mediation results (Kleiboer, 1996). The purpose of this thesis 
is to understand the effects of context and process on success of international mediation 
efforts in conflicts in Northern Ireland and Cyprus. In doing so, ―Contingency Model of 
Mediation‖ proposed by Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille (1991) will be used and 
hypotheses they have put forward through this model will be tested on the above mentioned 
cases. The aim is to see how context and process affect success of international mediation and 
whether or not Contingency Model of Mediation is sufficient to explain the determinants of 
success in international mediation.  
 
1.2 Contingency Model of Mediation 
A large number of quantitative studies analyzed patterns of international disputes. In 
works of Maoz (1982) and Cioffi-Revilla (1990), these are well summarized. However, 
Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille developed one of the most comprehensive data sets on 
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international conflicts. Their data set covers all international disputes for the period of 1945-
89. For the purpose of their data set, they use Small and Singer’s (1982) definition of 
international dispute: “...an organized and continuous armed conflict between two states 
which resulted in at least 100 fatalities.” They scanned two major contemporary press 
sources, Keesing’s Contemporary Archives and the New York Times Index, for the entire 
period. At the end, they found 79 international disputes that met their criteria, 44 (56%) of 
which were mediated. Since some disputes were mediated more than once, the total number 
of mediation attempts was 284.  
 
Creating an index of successful mediation outcomes is complicated as mediation 
outcomes may be perceived and defined very differently. In their data set, Haas’s success 
index (Haas, 1986) was modified by focusing on the behavioral impact of international 
mediation. Mediation is defined as fully successful when it is given credit for making a great 
difference to or settling a dispute. It is partially successful when its efforts initiate negotiations 
and some dialogue between the parties. Mediation success is limited when it achieves only a 
ceasefire or break in hostilities. It is unsuccessful when it has no discernible impact on the 
dispute. Table below presents the outcomes achieved in each of the 284 mediation cases.   
 
TABLE 1. 
 
 
Table also gives us an idea of the general probability of the success of mediation. This 
provides an index against which the impact of different variables can be judged. Where 
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mediation achieves a likelihood of success above 22%, we can assume that the conditions 
involved will contribute positively to the likelihood of a successful outcome. 
 
To identify all the factors that may influence mediation outcomes and mediator 
behavior, to analyze and assess their relative importance, there is a need for a broad 
conceptual framework that can subsume the versatility of mediators' behaviors, guide the 
research, and integrate the findings. The approach that allows best to develop theoretical 
insights and engage in empirical analysis is the contingency approach (Bercovitch, 
Anagnoson, and Wille, 1991). The contingency approach has its roots in the social-
psychological theories of negotiation as developed by Sawyer and Guetzkow (1965) and 
modified by Druckman (1977). Their combined approach provides a framework that permits a 
systematic analysis of the underlying structures and conditions that shape conflict events and 
the complex relationships of the conflict management process. The framework developed 
takes account of the individual influences of personal, role, situational, goal, interactional, and 
outcome variables (Bercovitch 1984; Fisher and Keashly 1991; Gochman 1993; Keashly and 
Fisher 1996; Robinson and Snyder 1965) and their interactive effects within the context, 
process, and outcome of conflict management. “The contingency framework is particularly 
useful in the study of mediation. It offers a dynamic framework of interactive and reciprocal 
behaviors. It provides a reproducible model of mediation that permits operationalization and 
analysis of individual contextual clusters, their interactions, and relative importance within 
conflict management. This approach also provides a useful tool for scholars by offering a 
framework within which they can diagnose and analyze mediators' behavior and decisions 
and determine the appropriateness of various strategies in their interventions” (Bercovitch 
and Houston, 2000).  
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TABLE 2. 
 
The model proposes that a series of attributes identified as either contextual or process 
variables (the independent variables) interact directly to affect mediation outcomes (the 
dependent variable).  
 
1. Context Variables 
 
1.1 Characteristics of the Parties 
 
1.1.1 Regime Types 
 
A traditional hypothesis in the study of international relations posits that those states 
which are more democratic or pluralistic are less prone to initiate violent interactions than 
their non-democratic counterparts. Mack & Snyder (1957) suggest that the greater ability of 
these states to channel and accommodate internal discontent makes them less likely to exhibit 
external aggression. Maoz & Abdolali (1989), however, find no support for this hypothesis, 
arguing instead that democratic states are no less prone to conflict than any other type of 
regime, although they rarely fight among themselves. By analyzing the data set it was found 
that disputes involving multi-party regimes may be slightly more amenable to mediation than 
those involving other regime types. In those conflicts where one of the disputants was a multi- 
party state, the average probability of successful mediation was 24% (i.e. above the overall 
average of 22%). In the 34 mediation attempts involving two multi-party states, 35% were 
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successful. The corresponding figure for the 36 mediation attempts between one-party state 
dyads was only 6%.  
H1. Mediation attempts involving two multi-party states are more likely to be successful. 
1.1.2 Relative Power 
Another condition that may influence the effectiveness of international mediation 
concerns the degree of power disparity between the adversaries. Both Ott (1972) and Young 
(1967) suggest that the smaller the power differences between the adversaries, the greater the 
effectiveness of international mediation. Logically this seems quite obvious. In cases of clear 
power disparity the stronger adversary may not be prepared to countenance any concessions 
or compromises which are essential to mediation success. Others, such as Deutsch, argue that 
conflicts in which there is a mutual recognition of differential power and legitimacy (1973, p. 
46) will be more easily resolved. Presumably, the presence of a fairly unambiguous advantage 
by one of the parties makes the path of settlement clearer by indicating which side will be 
expected to make the greater concessions. Some of the strongest findings concern the relation 
between the degree of power disparity and the success of mediation. And in those disputes 
that were mediated between unequal states, only 6% were successful. Where both parties were 
of roughly equal power, the probability of mediating successfully was over five times as great 
(32%).  It would seem then that the presence of large differentials in power resources makes 
mediation much more difficult and considerably reduces the chances of a successful outcome.  
H2. Mediation attempts between states with roughly equal power are more likely to be 
successful. 
1.1.3 Previous Relations 
The previous relationship between the parties is posited by Deutsch (1973) to be one of 
the most important determinants of conflict outcomes. He suggests that parties with a history 
of friendship or cooperation will also approach a present conflict more cooperatively. Not 
surprisingly, it appears significantly easier to mediate between friends. A mediator entering 
this type of dyad has almost twice the chance of success compared to any other mediation 
(46%/ as opposed to an average of 22% for all others). Furthermore, though adversaries with a 
past history of more than one dispute receive most mediation attempts, they also demonstrate 
the lowest probability of success (16%). This suggests that a conflictual relationship may 
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exacerbate a current dispute and the efforts to settle it. Previous friendly relations between the 
parties facilitate mediation and increase its chances of success.  
H3. Mediation attempts between states with a history of friendship are more likely to be 
successful. 
1.2  The Nature of the Dispute 
Kressel and Pruitt (1989), in their excellent review of mediation research, conclude that 
unfavorable dispute characteristics "are likely to defeat even the most adroit mediators" (p. 
405). Similarly, Ott (1972) argues that "the success or failure of mediation is largely 
determined by the nature of the dispute, with the characteristics and tactics of the mediator 
marginal at best" (p. 597).  Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille (1991) reviewed three general 
aspects pertaining to the nature of the dispute that are generally thought to affect its course 
and outcome. These are (1) the duration of the dispute at the time of intervention, (2) the 
intensity of the dispute, and (3) the issues at the heart of the dispute. 
1.2.1 Duration 
The duration of a dispute and timing of initiating mediation may determine, to some 
extent, the likelihood of its success. To be effective, mediation must take place at the right 
moment. There is, however, little agreement as to what constitutes, or how to recognize, such 
a moment. A number of studies speak of a crucial moment in the life cycle of a dispute at 
which mediation will be most likely to succeed. Northedge and Donelan (1971), for example, 
note that "the position is more favorable when there exists a concatenation of circumstances 
which are already in operation as tending toward an improvement of the situation" (p. 308). 
Zartman (1985) has suggested that a combination of "plateaus," "precipices," "deadlocks," 
and "deadlines" will produce moments of "ripeness" when the parties are highly motivated to 
settle their disputes. The assumption here is that in the waxing and waning of the complex 
social forces that make up an international dispute, there are moments during which both 
parties will welcome mediation more openly. The exact nature of these moments is a matter 
of considerable speculation. Some theorists, such as Claude (1971) and Edmead (1971), have 
suggested that mediation should be attempted early in the dispute, before positions become 
fixed, attitudes harden, and an escalating cycle becomes entrenched. Others, such as Ott 
(1972) and Pruitt (1981), suggest that mediation will be more successful later, when conflict 
10 
 
costs have become intolerable and both parties realize that they may lose too much by 
continuing their dispute.  
Generally, the longer a dispute goes on, the less amenable it is to mediation; but there 
does seem to be a minimum amount of time necessary before mediation is successful. 
Mediation attempts taking place one to three months into a dispute show a greater chance of 
success (37%) than those initiated when the conflict is less than one month old (23%). The 
issue of the timing of mediation raises a complementary question, namely, will the chance of 
mediating successfully increase on the second, third or subsequent attempts at mediation in 
the same dispute? The data indicates a slight increase in the probability of successful 
mediation after one or two previous attempts (32%). After this point, however, the probability 
of success begins a long decline.  
H4. Mediation attempts taking place one to three months into a dispute are more likely to be 
successful. 
1.2.2 Intensity 
Although intensity is regarded by everyone as an important dispute characteristic, there is 
a lack of clarity as to what precisely intensity signifies. Kressel and Pruitt (1989) conclude 
that high-intensity disputes are unlikely to experience successful mediation. But, under the 
rubric of intensity, they include such diverse factors as the "severity of prior conflict," the 
"level of hostility," "levels of anger," and "intensity of feeling," as well as the strength of 
"negative perceptions." They do not suggest how these can be defined, let alone 
operationalized. In their discussion of public-sector labor mediation, Kochan and Jick (1978) 
argue that "the intensity of the impasse will be negatively related to the effectiveness of the 
mediation process" (p. 213). But what they mean by "intensity" is not made explicit. This lack 
of definitional precision leads to considerable difficulty in operationalizing dispute intensity. 
To avoid this confusion, the number of fatalities is used as the most obvious and accessible 
measure of dispute intensity. It can logically be expected a high level of intensity to be 
reflected in the number of fatalities incurred by both sides. 
Here again the literature on mediation offers two contradictory notions. Jackson (1952) 
and Young (1967; 1968) suggest that the greater the intensity of a dispute, the higher the 
likelihood that mediation will be accepted and be successful (as a way of cutting losses, if 
nothing else). An opposite view contends that the greater the intensity and the higher the 
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losses, the more polarized the parties' positions will become and the more determined will 
each party be to reject any mediation effort and attempt to 'win' at all costs (Brockner, 1982; 
Burton, 1969; Modelski, 1964). Mediation is more likely to be accepted, and to be successful, 
in low intensity disputes. As the number of fatalities in a dispute increases, the likelihood that 
mediation initiatives will prove successful suffers a corresponding decline. Only 17% of 
mediation attempts have any degree of success in disputes of more than 1000 fatalities, 
compared with 42% in disputes of 1000-500 fatalities. Protracted and intense international 
disputes, though they receive far more attempts at mediation than less severe disputes, are not 
particularly amenable to mediation. 
H5. Mediation attempts in low-intensity disputes are more likely to be successful. 
1.2.3 Issues 
Issues in conflict refer to the underlying causes of a dispute. They may not always be 
clear. There may also be more than one issue involved, and parties themselves may not agree 
on what constitutes a disputed issue. Here five terms were used to describe issues; 
sovereignty, ideology, security, independence and a residual category of other issues. Each 
dispute was coded in terms of one issue only. Sovereignty disputes refer to conflicts where the 
adversaries have incompatible claims to a specific piece of territory (e.g. Argentina and 
England over the Falklands/ Malvinas). Ideology disputes exemplify strong disagreements 
over the nature of a political system, basic values or beliefs (e.g. the Iran-Iraq conflict). 
Security disputes are over frontiers, borders and territories (e.g. the 1967 Arab-Israeli war). 
Independence disputes are fought by countries seeking to liberate themselves from another 
state and to determine their own national selfhood (e.g. Mozambique-Portugal dispute). 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, our data indicate that disputes involving territory or 
security are far more amenable to mediation than those over issues of ideology or 
independence. Where territory or security were the basic issues in dispute, the probability of 
successful mediation was at or above the overall average (23% and 27%/ respectively). But in 
disputes of ideology (10%) or independence (11%), the chances of successful mediation were 
much lower. 
H6. Mediation attempts in conflict where territory or security are the basic issues are more 
likely to be successful. 
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1.3 The Identity and Characteristics of the Mediator 
The personal qualities required of a successful mediator have been given consider able 
attention in the literature (Jackson, 1952; Wehr, 1979; Young, 1967). The list of desired or 
desirable attributes for a successful international mediator is very long indeed. Among those 
qualities which experienced mediators cite as particularly important are intelligence, stamina, 
energy, patience and a sense of humor (Bercovitch, 1984). Another characteristic which has 
been traditionally cited as being strongly associated with effective mediation is even-
handedness or impartiality. Young claims that “a high score in such areas as impartiality 
would seem to be at the heart of successful interventions in many situations” (1967, p. 81). 
And his views are echoed by Jackson (1952) as well as by Northedge & Donelan (1971) who 
claim that the parties will have confidence in a mediator only if he/she is, and is seen to be, 
impartial. A mediator engages in behavior that is designed to elicit information and exercise 
influence. To exercise any degree of influence mediators need 'leverage' or resources. 
Leverage or mediator power enhances the mediator's ability to influence the outcome. The 
mediator's task is primarily one of reframing and persuasion. These are best achieved, as 
Zartman & Touval (1985) observe, not when a mediator is unbiased or impartial, but when 
he/she possesses resources which either or both parties value. Effective mediation in inter- 
national relations is thus related more to resources than to impartiality (Brookmire & Sistrunk, 
1980). In their research, Bercovitch and his colleagues have ranked all mediators along a 
dimension ranging from government leaders to representatives of international organizations, 
and related these to mediation outcomes. There was some indication that the leader of a 
government, possessing rank and prestige and having some ―leverage‖, has a better chance of 
mediating successfully than any other actor. Of the 34 mediation attempts made by 
government leaders, 32% were successful. Indeed all classes of mediators exhibited at or 
above average probabilities of success, except for the leaders of inter- national organizations. 
These mediators fared particularly badly in their mediation attempts, with a success rate of 
only 4%. 
H7. Mediation attempts by the leader of a government, possessing rank and prestige and 
having some 'leverage' are more likely to be successful. 
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2. Process Variable 
2.1 Strategies of the Mediator 
Finally, the relationship between mediator behavior can be examined, or, more 
specifically, mediation strategies and tactics, and mediation outcomes. While conceptualizing 
or measuring mediator behavior is difficult, there are many who agree with Kochan & Jick 
(1978) that this is the most critical variable affecting mediation outcomes. Mediator’s choice 
of strategy is not random. That choice is a rational response to a specific conflict situation; the 
needs, interests, capabilities, and perceptions of the parties, as well as those of the mediator; 
and the relevance of various sources of power and resources (Carnevale, 1986). These 
strategies build on Sheppard’s (1984) taxonomy of mediator behavior that focuses on the 
content, process, and procedural aspects of conflict management.  
 
For the purposes of their analysis, Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille (1991) came up with 
the most useful taxonomy of mediator behavior that can be applied to international conflict 
management identifies three fundamental mediator strategies along a continuum ranging from 
low to high intervention. These are: (1) communication-facilitation, (2) procedural, and (3) 
directive strategies.  
 
2.1.1 Communication-facilitation strategies 
 
They describe mediator behavior at the low end of the intervention spectrum. Here a 
mediator typically adopts a fairly passive role, channeling information to the parties, 
facilitating cooperation, but exhibiting little control over the more formal process or substance 
of mediation. This is referred to at times as the consultation model, and is best exemplified by 
Norway’s role in achieving the Oslo agreement between Israel and the PLO. 
 
2.1.2 Procedural strategies  
 
They enable a mediator to exert a more formal control over the process and environment 
of the mediation. Here a mediator may determine structural aspects of the meetings, control 
constituency influences, media publicity, the distribution of information, and the situation of 
the parties’ resources and communication processes. When New Zealand mediated the 
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Bougainville conflict in 1995, it brought both parties to a military camp in New Zealand and 
exercised full control over the procedural aspects of the interaction (but little or no control 
over other aspects). 
 
2.1.3 Directive strategies  
 
They are the most powerful form of intervention. Here a mediator affects the content and 
substance of the bargaining process by providing incentives for the parties to negotiate or by 
issuing ultimatums. Directive strategies aim to change the way issues are framed and the 
behavior associated with them. This style is exemplified by Richard Holbrook’s mediation 
efforts at Dayton, Ohio. 
 
Clearly, the more effective strategies in international mediation arc the more active 
strategies. Mediators employing directive or substantive strategies are successful, on average, 
41% of the time. Mediation strategies that can prod the adversaries, and strategies that allow 
mediators to introduce new issues, suggest new ways of seeing the dispute or alter the 
motivational structure of the parties, are more positively associated with successful outcomes 
than any other type of intervention. Active mediation strategies can affect, and be responsive 
to, a wider variety of dispute situations than less active ones. 
 
H8. Mediation attempts with directive strategies of the mediator are more likely to be 
successful. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1 Comparative Case Study Research 
 
The aim of the research design is to establish the relevance between the propositions, 
driven from quantitative studies and the cases and comparatively examine the cases for the 
assessment of the determinant affecting success of international mediation. The goal here is to 
develop propositions for further inquiry which makes the research an exploratory one. It is a 
comparative case study design with a single unit of analysis –international mediation and 
multiple cases –Northern Ireland and Cyprus, in which a set of features will be examined 
during a period of time (Neuman, 2006). Yin (2003) defines a case study as ―investigation of 
a contemporary phenomenon, when the researcher has limited control over behavioral 
events‖. For Yin, cases should be selected in such a manner so that they either predict similar 
results or produce contrary results, but for predictable reasons. Moreover, the universe from 
which the cases are to be selected should be well defined such that the cases to be compared 
come from the same class or universe of cases (Druckman, 2005, p. 211). 
 
By analyzing the mediation efforts of George Mitchell (in Northern Ireland conflict) 
and Kofi Annan (in Cyprus conflict), the research tries to answer the question of ―what 
determinants did affect the success of international mediation in Northern Ireland and 
Cyprus?‖  In doing so, propositions driven from Jacob Bercovitch’s quantitative study of 
multiple mediation efforts will be asked to the two cases. How the determinants of success in 
international mediation proposed in Contingency Model of Mediation affected the outcome in 
Northern Ireland and Cyprus and whether or not these determinants are sufficient to explain 
the outcome will be studied. Context and process variables proposed in the contingency 
model are the independent variables of this research which affect the outcome of international 
mediation. Outcome of the international mediation –success or failure is the dependent 
variable of the thesis. 
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2.2 Reasons for Choosing These Cases 
The reason why these cases were chosen was not only their appropriateness for the 
application of the model for success of mediation but also their appropriateness for 
conducting a fruitful comparison. In comparative studies, most different or most similar cases 
should be chosen to be able to make valuable comparisons. In this research the most similar 
cases were tried to be chosen with a major difference in the outcome.  
 
When the history and characteristics of conflicts in Northern Ireland and Cyprus are 
examined, many similarities can be found. Both conflicts are on an island between two groups 
of different ethnic and religious backgrounds. Parties of both conflicts are associated with a 
country of secondary position which is influential on the conflict. The time period and 
fatalities of the conflicts are similar. Both conflicts are in Europe and draw the attention of 
international society intensely. Several formal and informal third party interventions were 
made prior to the mediations efforts studied in this thesis. Although the number of similarities 
can be increased, the main difference between the two mediation cases was the success of the 
efforts in Northern Ireland conflict, creating Belfast Agreement, and failure of the efforts in 
Cyprus conflict with the rejection of Annan Plan.  
 
2.3 Data Collection Methods 
 
Having mentioned the research methodology of the research and the reasons for 
choosing the two cases, it is worthwhile to explain how the data will be collected and 
analyzed. Although data collection for case studies can rely on many sources of evidence, Yin 
(2003) names six most important ones: documentation, archival records, interviews, direct 
observation, participant-observation and physical artifacts. Although any of the sources of 
evidence can be the sole basis for entire studies, an approach to the individual sources of 
evidence is not recommended for case studies. Contrarily, the chance of using multiple 
sources of evidence is the major strength of a case study. It gives the researcher the 
opportunity to address a broader range of historical, attitudinal and behavioral issues. Most 
importantly it enables development of a ―converging lines of inquiry‖, which is a process of 
triangulation. ―With triangulation, the potential problem of construct validity also can be 
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addressed, because the multiple sources of evidence essentially provide multiple measures of 
the same phenomenon‖ (Yin, 2003). 
 
In the data collection for this thesis three different methods were used in order to reach 
triangulated results. Firstly, documentary information which is relevant to every case study 
topic was collected. Various forms of documentary information were analyzed. Formal 
studies –academic articles, evaluations of the same topic, books written on the topic were the 
main sources of evidence. Moreover, in the Northern Ireland cases a memory book of George 
Mitchell himself describing the process of mediation was very much referred.  
 
Secondly, interviews were conducted with some NGO representatives, academics, 
policy makers and other experts on the issues. Focused interview type (Merton, 1990) was 
chosen in which the researcher interviewed a respondent for a short period of time, in an 
open-ended nature and a conversational manner by following a certain set of questions 
derived from the case study model. The main purpose of the interviews was to corroborate 
certain facts that have already been established by the research. The respondents were asked 
whether or not the determinants of success in international mediation proposed in the 
contingency model were valid in the two particular cases.  
 
Lastly, direct observation method was used to collect data. Among two ways of direct 
observation -formal and less formal (Yin, 2003), the latter was employed. Less formal direct 
observations are made throughout a field visit, including other occasions during which other 
evidence, such as that from interviews, is being collected. Two field visits to Northern Ireland 
and to Cyprus were made during which while conducting interviews, direct observations of 
the conflict and peace processes were made. Together with documentation and interviews, 
being in the field gave the researcher a better understanding of historical and behavioral 
factors affecting the process of international mediation. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CAUSES OF CONFLICTS 
3.1. History of the Conflict in Cyprus 
Cyprus as a small island with a strategic location at the crossroads of Europe, Asia and 
Africa was first colonized by the ancient Greeks and conquered by every ruling empire in the 
region up to 1571 when the Ottoman Turks took over control. During the Ottoman period 
predominantly Greek Cypriot population grew to include 20% Turkish Cypriots composed 
descendants of soldiers and settlers of Turkish origin. In 1878, Cyprus came under British 
administration and in 1923, the sovereignty on the island passed from Turkey to Britain until 
independence was granted in 1960. During Ottoman time, Orthodox Church of Cyprus has the 
control over the affairs of the Greek Cypriots, meaning that the two communities functioned 
separately. It was the case in the British period when two groups were dealt with separately in 
education, religion and cultural affairs while English becoming a common language with 
establishment of British style institutions.  
During the four centuries before the independence, Turkish-Cypriot population was 
living both in separate and mixed villages with the Greek Cypriots, although usually in 
separate sections. While social relations were harmonious, religious lines were visible about 
intermarriage. Few Greek Cypriot spoke Turkish while 40% of Turkish Cypriots spoke Greek. 
So English became the language of common interchange. At the end of the day, the two 
groups had formed only a limited sense of being Cypriot, while they have a stronger identity 
attached to their ethnic groups and the two nations of origin.  
The Greek Cypriot community during the British rule deployed the idea of union with 
Greece (enosis) and formed National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) in 1955. This 
campaign and its reactions caused loss of several hundred lives and alienation of Turkish 
Cypriots, who countered enosis with a call for partition into separate communities (taksim) 
each associated with its motherland. The Turkish Cypriots aligned themselves more with the 
British rulers and formed Turkish Defense Organization (TMT), which engaged in inter-
communal fight with Greek Cypriots until a ceasefire was implemented in 1958. 
In 1960 a constitution was created with a complex power sharing arrangement which 
includes a national legislature, two communal chambers, a cabinet, public service, police 
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force and an army. Archbishop Makarios became the first president of the Republic of Cyprus 
and Dr. Fazıl Küçük was the Vice-President, as leader of the Turkish Cypriot community. The 
constitution was backed by a set of treaties which established two sovereign British military 
bases, allowed the stationing of small Greek and Turkish contingents and provided for 
military intervention by Britain, Turkey or Greece to guarantee the independence and 
territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. 
The life of this constitution did not last long, when Greek Cypriots proposed a set of 
constitutional amendments which would reduce the autonomy and representation of the 
Turkish Cypriots, who had been blocking taxation and other legislation to protest the lack of 
implementation on the joint municipalities. The amendments were rejected by the Turkish 
Cypriots and Turkey, inter-communal violence broke out and the two communities embarked 
on a hostile and protracted process of separation and segregation (Fisher, 2001). 
During the Cold War periods, the US and the UK saw Cyprus issue as conflict that 
should be contained before it escalated to the level of an armed conflict between Turkey and 
Greece as two NATO allies. In 1963, US President Lyndon Johnson tried to mediate between 
Turkey and Greece with no desired results emerged from Johnson’s appeals to the conflict 
parties. In January 1964, London Conference, as British initiative, also failed. This was 
followed by the Anglo-American sponsored NATO proposal that offered NATO 
peacekeeping forces and mediation. On March 4, 1964, the UN Security Council passed 
resolution 186, which called for stationing of a UN peace-keeping force in Cyprus 
(UNFICYP) and the UN Secretary General appointed a mediator to resolve the conflict. In 
summer of the same year, US initiated talks between Turkey and Greece with Dean Acheson 
as the mediator who proposed the Acheson Plan, according to which Cyprus would unite with 
Greece and in return, Turkey would receive the Greek island of Kasstellorizon and a military 
based on Cyprus. However, the plan was rejected by Makarios and Greece.  
In March 1965, Galo Plaza was appointed as the mediator by the UN Secretary 
General. He wrote a report recommending that a solution could be found if the parties worked 
to restore the situation that had existed before December 1963. This time the Turkish 
government rejected the report as a basis for negotiation. By fall of 1965, the inter-communal 
violence increased in Cyprus which led Turkey and Greece come to the brink of a war 
because of the intervention of Greek troops to the island. To prevent two NATO allies from 
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going to war, US sent Cyrus Vance to undertake a shuttle diplomacy between Athens, Ankara 
and Nicosia. In November 1967, the US efforts created an agreement which provided the 
withdrawal of all but 3000 Greek troops from Cyprus. So the main objective of mediation 
efforts during 1963-1968 was to prevent a war between two NATO allies. These mediation 
efforts did not bring any result for a solution to the Cyprus conflict and the two communities 
in Cyprus were not even invited to most of the negotiations. 
From 1968 to 1974, inter-communal talks between Turkish Cypriots and Greek 
Cypriots continued with no result. The lack of willingness to cooperate on both sides and the 
different approaches in the negotiations were the main reasons of the failure. On the one hand, 
Turkish Cypriots were trying to maintain the regional autonomy and supporting a ―total 
package‖ approach of negotiation. On the other hand, Greek Cypriots were trying to maintain 
total control of government and creation of a unitary state and insisting on a ―piecemeal‖ 
approach of negotiation (Sözen, 2007). 
In 1974, a major crisis occurred after an Athens inspired coup against Makarios. After 
fights between coupists and left wing supporters of Makarios, attacks were directed to Turkish 
Cypriot villages which provided legitimacy under the 1960 agreements for a military 
intervention by Turkey. Following the failure of diplomatic efforts, Turkish forces occupied 
approximately 37% of the northern part of the island. A UN-brokered ceasefire extended the 
original ―Green Line‖ in the capital of Nicosia (Lefkoşa) across the entire length of the island, 
where it remains today (Fisher, 2001). The two sides held five rounds of inter-communal talks 
during April 1975 – February 1976 which are knows as the Vienna talks which resulted in an 
agreement to transfer the population from north to south and vice versa (Sözen, 2007). Thus 
the events of 1974, in which several thousand people were killed or went missing, had the 
effect of creating two homogeneous ethnic zones on the island (Fisher, 2001).  
The Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş invited his counterpart Makarios to direct 
meetings. These meeting resulted in ―the Four Guidelines‖ as the basis for future negotiations. 
After Makarios passed away, Kyprianou was elected as the Greek Cypriot President. The 
negotiations between Denktaş and Kyprianou under the auspices of the UN Secretary General 
Kurt Waldheim resulted in the ―Ten Point Agreement‖ which confirmed the Four Guidelines 
and continued to be the basis for negotiations. After the failure of negotiations in 1979, the 
UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim appointed Hugo Gobi to reactivate the inter-communal 
21 
 
dialogue in August 1980. He drafted an evaluation paper, known as the Interim Agreement. 
By 1983, there was an apparent progress reached on paper. However, talks went on impasse 
because of Kyprianou’s reluctance to continue face-to-face talks. For him, it would have 
meant recognition of Denktaş as an equal. Kyprianou’s not accepting Denktaş as an equal 
during the negotiations led the Turkish Cypriots to declare the ―Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus‖ (TRNC).  
UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar tried to formulate a comprehensive approach 
for the inter-communal talks. In 1984, he produced Draft Framework Agreement. The draft 
agreement was accepted by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community uncondionally. 
Kyprianou also stated his satisfaction and the draft agreement was signed in 1985. However, 
after visiting Greece, Kyprianou announced that the draft agreement was unacceptable. He 
demanded to renegotiate the issues in the agreement. Perez de Cuellar drafted a new 
document but this time it was rejected by Denktaş. In 1986, after two rounds of technical 
talks, Cuellar drafted a new agreement which was accepted by Denktaş but rejected by 
Kyprianou after consulting with Greece. Inter-communal talks came to a halt after Greek 
Cypriot elections in 1988 when Kyprianou lost the election and Vassiliou became the 
president.  
On March 1990, the UN Security Council Resolution 649 was produced. UN Secretary 
General Cuellar brought two leaders together in Cyprus and they met more than forty times in 
Nicosia. The meetings of the leaders continued in New York at the UN Headquarters. In 
August 1992, the UN Secretary General Boutros Ghali came up with a ―Set of Ideas‖ which 
was the most detailed plan on Cyprus conflict. Two sides came very close to an agreement at 
the UN Headquarters; however when Boutros Ghali permitted the two leaders to return home 
for consultation, both of them indicated that the Set of Ideas could not be accepted 
unconditionally.  
Significant indication of the 1992 negotiations was the obvious acceptance by the UN 
that the main problem was the deep lack of trust between the two communities. In November 
1992, The UN Secretary General produced a series of ―Confidence Building Measures‖. In 
1994, when the European Court of Justice issued a decision that banned TRNC exports to the 
UK markets, the atmosphere in which the UN was trying to build trust was negatively 
affected. The court decision was seen by the Turkish Cypriots as the continuation of more 
22 
 
embargoes and unfair treatment by the international community. At the end, Confidence 
Building Measures also joined the earlier failed solution proposals to the conflict.  
The new UN Secretary General Kofi Annan brought Clerides and Denktaş to talk face-
to-face in New York and Geneva in 1997. However, the talks did not create any agreement 
when the EU decided to open accession negotiations with the Greek Cypriot Republic of 
Cyprus on behalf of the whole island. In 1999, two sides came together reluctantly. Denktaş 
stayed on table with the pressures from Turkey after the announcement of Turkey’s candidacy 
to the EU at Helsinki Summit. When Denktaş’s confederation thesis did not take place in the 
non-paper of the UN Secretary General, he walked out after five rounds of talks.  
When Denktaş invited Clerides for a dinner at his house in 2001, two leaders decided 
to open face-to-face talks. The pressing EU enlargement calendar pushed the UN to put a 
comprehensive solution plan in front of the two sides in November 2002. This plan, also 
known as the Annan plan, has been the most comprehensive and the most detailed solution 
plan on the issue. The plan was modified two times in 2002 and 2003 to meet the demands of 
the two sides. However, the two sides could not reach an agreement at the Hague meeting in 
March 2003.  
The Turkish government who wanted to open Turkey’s accession negotiations with 
the EU in 2005 took the initiative to restart the Cyprus negotiations. After diplomatic efforts 
with the UN, the US and the EU, Turkey convinced the UN Secretary General that Turkish 
side has the political will to continue and finalize the negotiations by 1 May 2004. Kofi 
Annan invited the two sides together with Turkey and Greece to New York in February 2004. 
The two Cypriot sides with the pressure of their motherlands, the US, the UN and the EU, 
reluctantly agreed on the conditions of the UN Secretary General for the resumption of the 
negotiations. According to his conditions, the two Cypriot sides would negotiate until March 
21. If they could not reach an agreement, Turkey and Greece would join them to reach a 
resolution during 22-29 March. If there still would be unresolved issues, the UN would fill in 
the gaps of the solution plan. At the end, the final plan would be put to the simultaneous and 
separate referenda for the Greek and Turkish Cypriots on 24 April 2004. 
After the Nicosia negotiations between the two Cypriot parties, Turkey and Greece 
joined negotiation process in Bürgenstock. At the end of Bürgenstock negotiations the final 
plan, known as the 5th Annan Plan was produced by the UN and put to simultaneous and 
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separate referenda for the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. While the plan was accepted with a 
65% YES vote by the Turkish Cypriots, it was rejected with a 76% NO vote by the Greek 
Cypriots. 
3.2. History of the Conflict in Northern Ireland 
The British government decided to implement a more comprehensive plan of 
colonization in the northern parts of Ireland and invited settlers, mainly from Scotland to start 
living in the northern part of the island. The settlers who came there during 17th and 18th 
century did not integrate with the local Irish. Although this was a part of British policy to 
secure the segregation of the natives from the settlers, the main reason of segregation was 
religious based. While the settlers practiced a different version of Christianity called 
―Protestantism‖, the indigenous Irish were mainly Roman Catholics. 
This segregation created resentment towards the settlers by the native Irish and the 
settlers felt under threat from the Irish. In 1703, after a successful colonization period of 
Ulster, 14% of the land of the island was owned by the Irish, where as in Ulster, 5% of the 
land remained in indigenous ownership (Darby, 1997, p. 20). By 1921, only 10% of the south 
was Protestant while the percentage of Protestants was 70% in the north.  
Since the beginning of colonization, Irish people often tried to gain their independence 
from the British, and finally, in 1920, the British government agreed to give independence to 
the island. However, the Protestants in the north were afraid that their religious freedom 
would be restricted under the rule of mainly Catholic Ireland. Also they were afraid of the 
poorer economic state of the rest of the island, compared to their own relatively prosperous 
and more industrialized region.  
The Protestants threatened to use force if they will be a part of a united Ireland and 
they mobilized private armies against it. The British Prime Minister, Lloyd George, insisted 
that the island should be divided into two sections which are the northeastern six counties and 
the rest of the island. Irish Catholic leaders under significant pressure accepted the offer and 
the Unionists accepted it, although reluctantly, as their first wish was for the whole of the 
island to remain within United Kingdom. This decision of partition led to a violent conflict 
between pro-partition groups and anti-partition groups. In 1923, those who accepted the 
partition achieved a victory and the Irish Free State was formally created. In 1938, it adopted 
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the status of a republic, under the official name of Eire, although it is known internationally as 
the Republic of Ireland. 
The establishment of the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland ensured the 
development of two sectarian states. The majority of the 4 million citizens of the Republic 
were Catholics and at the time of partition in 1921, Northern Ireland had a population of about 
1.5 million, a million of whom were Protestant and mostly Unionist. The Catholics were not 
happy with living in a state where there was a discrimination against them. When Protestants 
took power, they established a Protestant state, which discriminated against Catholics in 
housing, job, and political representation. Cameron Report (1969) documented the existence 
of such discrimination from 1921 to 1971, which was the main focus of late 1960s civil rights 
campaigns.  
Such a sectarian hostility was inevitable result of the British strategy of separation 
between settlers and natives which later created an extremely divided society, which has 
maintained most of its divisions to this day and is evident in the living territories (Murtagh, 
1999). Most of the villages are completely owned by either Catholics or Protestant which can 
be recognized from the flags, murals, graffiti, kerbstones and churches. City life is often 
separated as well. Leisure centers are usually associated with a particular tradition. Border 
areas within the cities are usually well defined by flags, graffiti and painted kerbstones. There 
are 19 sectarian borders and interfaces in Belfast where high peace walls have had to be built 
between neighboring streets. The education system is also segregated (Gallagher, 1998). The 
state schools are open to all religions but rarely attended by Catholics. Sports also reflect the 
segregation. Catholics usually play indigenous Irish games like Gaelic football, camogie and 
hurling. Protestants generally play rugby, hockey and crickets which are associated with 
Britain. Cultural celebrations like marches and festivals for particular victories or 
commemorate loses are often divisive and sometimes create violence. The overall situation 
shows that substantial number of people live, work, study and socialize within their 
communities and develop close relationships with someone from the other community. 
In such a separated society, inevitably the civil rights movement against Catholic 
discrimination started in 1968, which was met with suspicion and fear by the Protestant 
Unionists. The Unionist reacted with anger and sometimes violence to the Catholic demands 
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of equality. When Catholics understood that equality under the existing state structure is 
impossible, they see a united Ireland as the only solution. 
Irish Republican Army (IRA), who were the descendants of the most forceful military 
group which fought for independence in 1921 was the major supporter of the use of violence 
for a united Ireland. Although they were a small group in 1969, more and more people needed 
IRA protection as the conflict became a violent one following riots after civil rights marches. 
IRA was confronting the British troops who arrived to assist with riot control. IRA started 
extensive bombing campaigns directed against civilians, public utility and military targets. 
Security mismanagements such an internment without trial in 1971, which was only directed 
to Catholics, helped recruitment to the group. In 1972, the killing of 13 unarmed men during a 
civil rights demonstration of Catholics in Derry/Londonderry, which became known as 
Bloody Sunday, increased community tension. 
The Unionist paramilitaries also began to re-emerge in the 60s. The Ulster Volunteer 
Force (UVF) and Ulster Defense Association (UDA) were the main Unionist groups. They 
were worried about the civil rights reforms as threatening the existing Protestant supremacy in 
Northern Ireland. When violence erupted to the streets in 1969, recruitment to the Unionist 
paramilitaries was increased. Men in all the working class areas of Belfast formed themselves 
into vigilante groups. In 1991, the number of active paramilitaries was estimated to be 200-
300 Republican and 150-200 Unionist, although they had active and passive support from 
many more people in their communities. Despite their small number, they have carried out 
most of the horrific bombings, shootings, kidnappings and have been responsible for 90% of 
the deaths in Northern Ireland during 25 years of the conflict. 
Since the communities’ elected representatives was no successful in bringing a 
political agreement within the region, the paramilitary violence continued. The objectives of 
political parties were not different than those of paramilitary groups and the constitutional 
political parties often accused each other of secretly colluding with different paramilitaries. 
Among Catholics the main proponent of the desire of a united Ireland was the Social 
Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP) which usually polls about 20% of the vote. Sinn Fein, 
which is seen as the political wing of the IRA, usually polls between 10% to 16% in Northern 
Ireland and about 2% in the Republic of Ireland. Among Protestants who wish to retain the 
constitutional link with Britain, there were two main Unionist political parties, the Ulster 
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Unionist Party (UUP) and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which between them poll 
just over half of the total vote. The Alliance Party is generally seen as a more moderate 
political party, containing members from both Protestant and Catholic communities. It has 
variously polled from 6% to 10% of the vote. During the late 1990s several small political 
parties emerged such as Progressive Unionist Party (PUP), the Ulster Democratic Party 
(UDP) and the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition (NIWC), they were committed to gaining 
a consensus among all parties to a just and equitable political agreement to the conflict in 
Northern Ireland. In general, the main question for political parties as well as the paramilitary 
campaigns was the one that pertained in 1921 –whether Ireland should be a country politically 
united under the governance of Dublin, or whether Northern Ireland should remain under 
sovereignty of Britain.  
With such a history of the island, it was inevitable that reaching an agreement should 
be so difficult. Although a reluctant agreement to divide the island was reached in 1921, the 
agreement satisfied no one. Following this agreement, little was done by the parties in the 
North and South to ensure the necessary contact and reconciliation work that might have 
diminished old suspicions and angers in the two parts of the island. After civil rights demands 
for Catholics in 1969, the existing Unionist government could not cope with it and the British 
government was forced to introduce direct rule from London in 1972. The British government 
suspended the Protestant-dominated government and set up a coordinating Northern Ireland 
Office to take control of Northern Ireland from London. A Secretary of State implemented 
this direct control and four ministers were appointed by the British government in London, 
which was a situation prevailed from 1974 to 1999. Since 1972, the British government and 
since 1995 the British and Irish governments tried to persuade political parties to come to an 
agreement about how to share power in Northern Ireland. Although the British government 
came close to achieving such an agreement in 1974 when the parties agreed to a form of 
power sharing in government, five months later it was destroyed by the Unionist 
paramilitaries who brought the region to a standstill by strike actions and road blockages.  
In the 80s, because of the continuing violence, the British government reluctantly 
turned towards external initiatives. In 1985, the British and Irish governments signed the 
Anglo-Irish Agreement, which was an international agreement lodged with the United 
Nations. With this agreement, it was recognized that any change in the status in Northern 
Ireland could only happen with the consent of the majority of people in Northern Ireland. It 
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also acknowledged that the Republic of Ireland had a legitimate interest in Northern Ireland. 
The agreement committed both governments to promote an agreed, devolved government that 
would secure widespread acceptance between both communities. Although the agreement was 
backed in Britain and Republic of Ireland, it was rejected by the Unionists, who saw it as 
diluting the union with Britain and by Sinn Fein, who saw it as confirming partition. Despite 
oppositions, the agreement was important key to the development of an eventual political 
solution.  
Following the agreement it became clear to Sinn Fein that military campaign of IRA 
would not result in British withdrawal from Northern Ireland and it became clear to the 
British army that given the community support, it could not defeat IRA through military 
means. Therefore, Sinn Fein started to explore an option of creating a much more widely 
based Nationalist political front for the aim of a united Ireland. In 1993, John Hume, the 
leader of the SDLP and Gerry Adams, the leader of Sinn Fein, started dialogue to see if they 
could achieve a political solution. At the end of discussions, they agreed upon a series of 
principles which they hoped would make it possible for the IRA to end the violence. Towards 
the end of 1993, the British government was having secret talks with Sinn Fein/IRA about 
how to end the violence and how to include Sinn Fein in talks once they had eschewed 
violence. 
In 1993, Irish and British governments agreed to the Downing Street Declaration, in 
which the governments agreed that a decision on the future of the Union was to be ratified by 
referenda both north and south of the border thus allowing the self-determination of the 
people of the island of Ireland which Sinn Fein had said was necessary if the violence of the 
IRA was to cease.  On 1 September 1994, the IRA began to complete halt to its military 
operations to try to achieve their aspirations through the political process which was followed 
by the Unionist paramilitary ceasefire and wish to be included in the coming political 
negotiations.  
In February 1995, the British and Irish governments produced another document 
called the Framework Document that outlined the British government’s perspective on a 
possible framework for internal government in Northern Ireland. The British government 
made paramilitary decommissioning a requirement for entry into political talks which 
threatened the process. For the IRA the ceasefire was enough for entry into the talks. In order 
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to solve this problem an International Body of Decommissioning was set up, chaired by the 
US senator George Mitchell and it reported in January 1996, advocating a set of six principles 
that should underline the process of political dialogue. The IRA, as a reaction to the 
principles, ended its ceasefire and exploded a huge bomb in London’s Canary Wharf, 
accusing the British government of wasting the opportunity for peace.  
In May 1997, a new Labor government, led by Tony Blair won a parliamentary 
majority. The new British government quickly set about drawing Sinn Fein back into 
dialogue. The British government gave several commitments to Sinn Fein which were 
policing reform, employment equality, action to address contentious parading by Protestant 
Orangemen through Catholic areas and the transfer of Republican prisoners from jails in 
England to jails in the Republic of Ireland. Moreover, it was announced that decommissioning 
was secondary to actually getting people into talks and the demand for decommissioning prior 
to entry into talks was dropped. These commitments were followed by an IRA ceasefire in 
July 1997. 
For the first time ever, talks which included all the parties to the conflict, that is the 
two governments, all the major political parties, and parties representing the main 
paramilitary organizations, began in September 1997 with US Senator George Mitchell as the 
chairman. Despite many difficult days, including periods when both Sinn Fein and the UDP 
were expelled from the talks for limited periods because of continuing violence by the parties 
with which they were associated, the talks continued. In April 1998, after 48 hours of 
intensive non-stop negotiations, all parties finally accepted the Belfast Agreement or the so-
called ―Good Friday Agreement‖ 
It was also agreed that the agreement would need the ratification of the majority of 
people on the island of Ireland, both North and South. A copy of Good Friday Agreement was 
sent to every household and the Agreement was put to a referendum. Despite the reluctance of 
many Unionists who saw the agreement as a sell-out to terrorism and the reluctance of some 
Republican, who saw it as a sell-out on their goals of a united Ireland, the agreement was 
passed with a Yes vote by over 71% of the people of Northern Ireland and 94% in the 
Republic of Ireland (Fitzduff, 2002). 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE CYPRUS CASE 
 
4.1 Context Variables 
4.1.1 Characteristics of Parties 
4.1.1.1 Regime Type 
Regime types of parties in the Cyprus conflict will be examined in order to understand 
whether they are multi-party democracies or other regime types. In doing so, the number of 
political parties in both parties and the history of elections will be taken into account.  
The Greek side of the island possesses a well-functioning multi-party democracy. The list 
of parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties is as follows: 
TABLE 3. Political Parties in Republic of Cyprus 
Parliamentary Parties Non-parliamentary Parties 
Democratic Rally United Democrats 
Progressive Party of Working People Fighting Democratic Movement 
Democratic Party CWI Cyprus 
Movement for Social Democracy National Popular Front 
European Party   
Ecological Movement   
 
To better understand the functioning of multi-party democracy, listing the results of 
recent elections is necessary. The results of legislative and parliamentary elections since 2001 
are: 
TABLE 4. 
REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS 
VOULE (ASSEMBLY) ELECTION OF 27 MAY 2001 
========================================================= 
 
Parties 
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--------------------------------------------------------- 
* AKEL - Anorthotikon Komma Ergazemenou Laou (Progressive  
   Party of the Working People) 
* DISI - Dimokratikos Sinagermos (Democratic Coalition) 
* DIKO - Dimokratikon Komma (Democratic Party) 
* ED - Enomeni Dimokrates (United Democrats) 
* KISOS - Kinima Sosialdimokraton (Social Democratic  
   Movement) 
* NO - Neoi Orizontes (New Horizons) 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
NATIONAL SUMMARY OF VOTES AND SEATS 
========================================================= 
Votes and seats are compared with the elections of 1996 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
467,543 voters, 428,981 (91.7%) voted 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Party                    Votes    %    Change   Seats 
---------------------------------------------------------  
AKEL                     142,648  34.7 (+01.7)  20 (+1)  
DIKO                      60,986  14.8 (-01.6)   9 (-1) 
DISI                     139,721  34.0 (-00.5)  19 (-1)  
ED                        10,635  02.6           1 
KISOS                     26,767  06.5           4 
NO                        12,333  03.0           1 
Others                    17,897  04.3           2 (-5) 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
17,994 (4.2%) invalid    410,987                56 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
TABLE 5. 
 
REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS 
LEGISLATIVE ELECTION OF 21 MAY 2006 
===================================================================
== 
Source: Cyprus government election website 
 
Parties 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* AKEL - Anorthotikon Komma Ergazemenou Laou (Progressive Party of  
   the Working People) 
* DISI - Dimokratikos Sinagermos (Democratic Coalition) 
* DIKO - Dimokratikon Komma (Democratic Party) 
* EK - Evropaiko Komma (European Party)  
* KISOS - Kinima Sosialdimokraton (Movement for Social Democracy) 
* KOP - Kinima Oikologoi Perivallontistoi (Ecological and  
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   Environmental Movement) 
 
NATIONAL SUMMARY OF VOTES AND SEATS 
===================================================================
== 
Votes and seats are compared with the elections of 2001 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Enrolled voters:          501,024 
Votes cast:               445,915  89.0 
Invalid votes:            24,828   05.6 
Valid votes:              421,087  94.4 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Party                     Votes    %      Change     Seats 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
AKEL                      131,066  31.1   -03.6      18  -02 
DIKO                       75,458  17.9   +03.1      11  +02 
DISI                      127,776  30.3   -03.7      18  -01 
EK                         24,196  05.8               3  +03 
KISOS                      37,533  08.9   +02.4       5  +01 
KOP                         8,193  02.0               1  +01 
Others                     16,865  04.0               - 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Total                     421,087                    56 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Similarly, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has a well-functioning multi-party 
democracy. The list of the political parties is: 
TABLE 6. Political Parties in Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
Major Parties Minor Parties 
Communal Democracy Party New Party 
Democratic Party New Cyprus Party 
Freedom and Reform Party National Birth Party 
National Unity Party Nationalist Peace Party 
Republican Turkish Party Solution and EU Party 
  United Cyprus Party 
 
The results of the legislative and presidential elections since 2003 are: 
TABLE 7. 
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TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN CYPRUS 
LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS OF 15 DECEMBER 2003 
===================================================================
========== 
Elections to the Temsilciler Meclisi (House of Representatives)  
Source: Cyprusmedianet website 
 
Parties 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* BDH - Baris ve Demokrasi Hareketi'ni (Peace and Democracy Movement) 
* CTP - Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi (Republican Turkish Party) 
* DP - Demokrat Partisi (Democratic Party) 
* UBP - Ulusal Birlik Partisi (Party of National Unity)  
 
NORTHERN CYPRUS SUMMARY 
===================================================================
========== 
Party                                  Votes    %                 Seats 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Democratic Party (DP)                  172,473  12.9  (-09.7)       7  (-6) 
Party of National Unity (UBP)          439,249  32.9  (-07.4)      18  (-6) 
Peace and Democracy Movement (BDH)     175,282  13.1                6  (+6) 
Republican Turkish Party (CTP)         469,279  35.2  (+21.8)      19  (+13) 
Others                                  77,261  05.8                -  (-7) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Total                                1,333,904                     50 
 
 
TABLE 8. 
 
TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN CYPRUS 
LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS OF 20 FEBRUARY 2004 
===================================================================
========== 
Elections to the Temsilciler Meclisi (House of Representatives)  
Source: Yeni Düzen Gazetesi website 
Parties 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* BDH - Baris ve Demokrasi Hareketi'ni (Peace and Democracy Movement) 
* CTP - Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi (Republican Turkish Party) 
* DP - Demokrat Partisi (Democratic Party) 
* UBP - Ulusal Birlik Partisi (Party of National Unity)  
 
NORTHERN CYPRUS SUMMARY 
===================================================================
========== 
Votes and seats are compared with those won at the December 2003 election. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Enrolled voters: 147,249 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Party                                  Votes    %                 Seats 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Democratic Party (DP)                  174,721  13.5  (+00.6)       6  (-1) 
Party of National Unity (UBP)          410,813  31.7  (-01.2)      19  (+1) 
Peace and Democracy Movement (BDH)      75,747  05.8  (-07.3)       1  (-5) 
Republican Turkish Party (CTP)         577,444  44.5  (+09.3)      24  (+5) 
Others                                  55,284  04.3                - 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Total votes cast                     1,294,009                     50 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
TABLE 9. 
 
TURKISH REPUBLIC OF NORTHERN CYPRUS 
LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS OF 19 APRIL 2009 
===================================================================
========== 
Elections to the Temsilciler Meclisi (House of Representatives)  
Source: Zaman website 
 
Parties 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
* CTP - Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi (Republican Turkish Party) 
* DP - Demokrat Partisi (Democratic Party) 
* ORP - Ozgurluk ve Reform Partisi (Freedom and Reform Party) 
* TDP - Toplumcu Demokrasi Partisi (Communal Democracy Party) 
* UBP - Ulusal Birlik Partisi (Party of National Unity)  
 
NORTHERN CYPRUS SUMMARY 
===================================================================
========== 
Votes and seats are compared with those won at the 2005 election. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Enrolled voters: 161,373 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Party                                  Votes    %                 Seats 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Communal Democracy Party (TDP)          97,334  06.9                2  +2 
Democratic Party (DP)                  150,695  10.6  -02.9         5  -1 
Freedom and Reform Party (ORP)          87,879  06,2                2  +2 
Party of National Unity (UBP)          622,804  44.0  +12.3        26  +7 
Republican Turkish Party (CTP)         415,574  29.3  -15.2        15  -9 
Others                                  42,166  03.0                - 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Total votes cast                      1,416,452                    50 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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When examining the number of parties and election results, it is clear that both parties to 
the Cyprus conflict have multi-party democracies. It was mentioned before that mediation 
attempts involving two multi-party states are successful 35% of the time, which is above the 
overall average of 22%. Because the Cyprus case is categorized as involving two multi-party 
states, mediation attempt is more likely to be successful.  
4.1.1.2 Relative Power 
As for the second independent variable, power relations between parties in the Cyprus 
conflict will be analyzed. In doing so, power is defined as pure military capabilities of the 
party itself and its mother land. And therefore, the power of the Republic of Cyprus, Greece, 
the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Turkey will analyzed based on military terms.  
Republic of Cyprus Armed Forces (Cyprus National Guard): 
According to The Military Balance, 1989-90, published by the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies in London, the National Guard had a complement of some 13,000 men 
on active duty in 1989. Scaled back from a peak of 35,000 in 1967, its size had remained 
fairly constant since the Turkish intervention in 1974. The bulk of its personnel were Greek 
Cypriot conscripts fulfilling twenty-six months of mandatory service.  
Soldiers completing their active duty continued to serve in the reserves until age fifty, 
and officers until age sixty-five. As of 1990, it was estimated that the National Guard could 
call upon 66,000 first-line reserves and more than 30,000 older second-line reserves. Selected 
reserve units were called upon periodically without advance notice to test the mobilization 
system. A certain percentage of the reserves were mobilized annually to participate in a week 
of National Guard field exercises. 
Armed Forces of Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Turkish Cypriot Security 
Force): 
In 1990 the dominant military force in the Turkish-administered northern sector of the 
island remained, as it had been since the Turkish invasion of 1974, the 28th and 39th infantry 
divisions of the Turkish Army, backed by an independent armored brigade and some artillery 
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support. The 28th division was headquartered at Asha (Pasaköy) to the northeast of Nicasia, 
and the 39th division near Morphou (Güzelyurt). The corps reserve was at Kythrea 
(Degirmenlik) to the northeast of Nicasia. The Turkish contingent was referred to officially as 
the Cyprus Turkish Peace Force. The original force of 40,000 troops was reduced shortly after 
the 1974 intervention. In early 1990, Turkish defense authorities claimed that the Cyprus 
contingent amounted to only 17,500, whereas Greek Cypriot authorities placed its strength at 
35,000. Independent sources believed that the force numbered about 30,000.  
Turkish Cypriot males were liable to conscription at age eighteen for a twenty-four-
month period of service. Discharged soldiers served in the reserves until the age of fifty. The 
number of first-line and second-line reserves was estimated at 5,000 and 10,000, respectively, 
as of 1989. 
TABLE 10. Armed Forces of Greece and Turkey 
  Armed Forces of Greece Armed Forces of Turkey 
Armed forces personnel 159.000 (31st of 166) 610.000 (7th of 166) 
Army personnel 116.000 (20th of 49) 525.000 (4th of 49) 
Armed forces growth minus 21 (93rd of 132) minus 3 (79th of 132) 
Expenditure % of GDP 4.48% (8th of 145) 3.23% (16th of 145) 
Expenditure in dollar figure 5.890.000.000 (7th of 111) 12.155.000.000 (10th of 111) 
Manpower availability 2.662.210 (70th of 175) 19.534.500 (17th of 175) 
Weapon holdings 5.488.000 (16th of 137) 10.049.000 (9th of 137) 
 
As it can be clearly seen from the military figures, Turkish Cypriot Armed Forces together 
with the support of Turkish army enjoys superiority in terms of military power. In statistical 
terms, it was mentioned that mediation attempts where parties have roughly equal power was 
five times greater (32%) than between unequal states (6%). The Cyprus case represents a 
mediation attempt between two parties with unequal power, and therefore, according to this 
criteria, it is more likely to be unsuccessful. 
4.1.1.3 Previous Relations 
To understand the history of relations between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, one 
needs to analyze the history between Turkey and Greece. The hostile history between two 
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motherlands is mirrored by the two communities of Cyprus. 1453, the year when Ottoman 
Turks conquered Istanbul (Constantinople), leading to the end of Byzantine Empire is  
considered as starting point of centuries long hostility between two parties. Although minor 
problems existed under Ottoman rule, relations were rather stable. Since Greece gained its 
independence from the Ottomans, the two countries have faced four major wars: 
The Greco Turkish War (1897):   
Greek politicians of the 19th century were determined to include all these territories 
within a greatly enlarged Greek state, based on the Byzantine model and with Constantinople 
(Istanbul) as its capital. This policy was called the Great Idea (Megali Idea). Constantinople 
had been the capital of the Eastern (i.e. Greek) half of the Roman Empire until its fall to the 
Turks in 1453. The Ottomans naturally opposed these plans. 
During the Crimean War (1854 to 1856), Britain and France restrained Greece from 
attacking the Ottomans, by occupying Piraeus. Again during the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 
the Greeks were keen to join in with the objective of territorial expansion, but Greece was 
unable to take any effective part in the war. Nevertheless, after the Congress of Berlin, in 
1881 Greece was given most of Thessaly and part of Epirus. 
In 1897, a new revolt in Crete led to the first Greco-Turkish War. An unprepared 
Greek army was unable to dislodge the Ottoman troops from their fortifications along the 
northern border, and with the resulting Ottoman counter-attack, the war had a humiliating end 
for Greece, also resulting in some minor losses of territory for her. 
The Balkan Wars (1912-1913): 
The Young Turks, who seized power in the Ottoman Empire in 1908, were Turkish 
nationalists whose objective was to create a strong, centrally governed state. The Christian 
minorities, the Greeks and Armenians, saw their position in the Empire deteriorate. Crete was 
once again the flashpoint of Greek and Turkish aspirations. The Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 
was a direct consequence of the mounting tension, as a result of which Greece seized Crete, 
the islands, the rest of Thessaly and Epirus, and coastal Macedonia from the Ottomans, in 
alliance with Serbia and Bulgaria. 
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The First World War (1914-1918): 
Greece entered the First World War in 1917 with the intention of seizing 
Constantinople (Istanbul) and Smyrna (İzmir) from the Ottomans, with the encouragement of 
Britain and France, who also promised the Greeks Cyprus at a certain stage. Although there 
was little direct fighting between Greeks and Turks, when the Ottoman Empire collapsed in 
1918 the Greeks were quick to claim the lands the Allies had promised them. The 1920 Treaty 
of Sèvres gave Greece eastern Thrace and an area of about 17,000 km² in western Anatolia 
around Smyrna. This Treaty was signed by the Ottoman government but never went into 
force, not having been ratified by Parliament. 
The Greco-Turkish War (1919-1922): 
Greece occupied Smyrna/İzmir on 15 May 1919, while Mustafa Kemal Pasha (later 
Atatürk), who was to become the leader of the Turkish opposition to the Treaty of Sèvres, 
landed in Samsun on May 19, 1919, an action that is regarded as the beginning of the Turkish 
War of Independence. He united the protesting voices in Anatolia and set in motion a 
nationalist movement to repel the armies that had occupied Turkey (including Italy, France 
and Britain) and establish new borders for a sovereign Turkish nation. Having created a 
separate government in Ankara, Kemal's government did not recognize the abortive Treaty of 
Sèvres and fought to have it revoked. The Greek advances into Anatolia were eventually 
checked and the Greek army was forced into retreat. 
The Turkish army entered Smyrna/İzmir on 9 September 1922, effectively ending the 
Greco-Turkish War (1919-1922) in the field. The Greek army and administration had already 
left by sea. The war was put to an end by the Armistice of Mudanya, and the Treaty of 
Lausanne replaced previous treaties to constitute modern Turkey. 
Apart from these major wars, the two countries have faced with several crises in their 
relations such as: 
In September 1955, riots broke out against the Greek minority in Istanbul. The events, 
also known as Istanbul pogrom, were orchestrated by the government of Turkish Prime 
Minister Adnan Menderes. The Turkish mob consisted partly of government supporters 
transported into the city in advance. The events were triggered by the circulation of false 
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rumor that the house in Thessaloniki where Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was born had been 
destroyed by Greek terrorists. 
Mobs assaulted Istanbul’s Greek community for nine hours. Although the 
orchestrators of the pogrom did not explicitly call for Greeks to be killed, between 13 and 16 
Greeks and at least one Armenian died during or after the pogrom as a result of lynching and 
arson. Many Greeks were severely wounded. 
During 1960s and 1970s, due to the developments in Cyprus, two counties came to 
edge of a war. Developments in Cyprus during this period have already mentioned in history 
of Cyprus conflict part of this thesis.  
Since the 1970s further issues arose between the two countries over sovereignty rights 
in the Sea. The conflict was motivated both by considerations of military tactical advantages 
and by questions of economic exploitation of the Aegean. The conflict over military flight 
activities has led to a practice of continuous tactical military provocations. Turkish aircraft 
regularly fly in the zones over which Greece claims control (i.e. the outer 4 miles of the 
claimed Greek airspace and the international parts of Athens FIR), while Greek aircraft 
constantly intercept them. Aircraft from both countries frequently engage in mock dog-fights.  
 
As it can be understood from the history of relations between the motherlands of the 
parties to the conflict and the history of relations between Greek Cypriots and Turkish 
Cypriots which was mentioned in the history of Cyprus conflict chapter of this thesis, the 
previous relations between parties have an antagonistic nature. Statistically, mediating 
between parties with a history of friendship and cooperation has a 46% probability of success. 
However, mediation attempts between parties with a history of more than one dispute 
demonstrate the lowest probability of success with 16%. Under this criteria, mediation 
attempts in the Cyprus case, which has a history of antagonistic relations is expected to be 
unsuccessful. 
4.1.2 Nature of Dispute 
4.1.2.1 Duration 
For the duration of the conflict in Cyprus, the chapter on the history of the conflict will be 
referred. If 1955, the formation of the National Organization of Cypriot Combatants (EOKA) 
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and Turkish civilians becoming a target for the EOKA is considered as the beginning of the 
conflict in Cyprus, the conflict had duration of 47 years by the time Kofi Annan intervened as 
the mediator in 2002. As the highest possibility of success is expected in mediation attempts 
taking place one to three months into a dispute, Kofi Annan’s mediation in the Cyprus 
conflict happened much later than this time period. Under duration criteria, mediation attempt 
in Cyprus case has a lower possibility of success as it was done at a much later stage of the 
conflict.  
4.1.2.2 Intensity 
To understand whether the Cyprus conflict was a high-intensity or low-intensity conflict, 
the total number of causalities from both parties should be calculated. The Greek sources and 
Turkish sources give different figures for the loses during the conflict, especially the number 
of causalities during the 1974 intervention of Turkey. Some Greek sources claim that the loses 
of Greek Cypriots and Greek army during the intervention were more than 6.000 people. 
According to Turkish army sources, Turkish Cypriots together with the Turkish army suffered 
840 causalities and 2.200 wounded. Greek Cypriots together with the Greek army had 4.000 
causalities and 12.000 wounded.  
Although the numbers differ from one source to another, both sources show that this is a 
high-intensity conflict with the number of fatalities over 1.000. According to the statistical 
data, mediation efforts in high-intensity conflicts have 17% probability of success while low-
intensity conflicts have a 42% success rate. Based on this criteria, then again mediations 
attempt in Cyprus case are expected to be unsuccessful. 
4.1.2.3 Issues 
In the literature review part, four types of issues were named: sovereignty, ideology, 
security and independence. During the interviews on the Cyprus conflict, a clear consensus 
emerged that the issues at stake are a combination of security and sovereignty. In a recent 
poll, Cypriots considered security as the primary issue in the Cyprus conflict. Secondly, 
sovereignty is an important issue with two dimensions. The first issue about sovereignty is 
whether there should be one sovereignty representing whole island of Cyprus or two 
sovereignties representing two different communities. The second dimension is that if one 
sovereignty exists, how then should power be distributed among two communities. Minor 
issues such as the property of Greek Cypriots, which they had to leave behind after Turkish 
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intervention, and Turkish Cypriots’ trying to become a part of international community are all 
related to the major issue of sovereignty. Although there is a difference in values as the two 
communities belong to different religions, both of them see multi-party democracy as the only 
possible political system on the island. Therefore, it cannot be said that the conflict is based 
on incapability about ideology. As Cyprus has already gained its independence from the 
British, it cannot be said that the main issue of the conflict is about independence. In general, 
the issues at stake in the Cyprus conflict are sovereignty and security. Statistics show that in 
conflicts where sovereignty and security are the basic issues, the probability of success in 
mediation is higher (23% and 27% respectively) compared to conflict related to ideology and 
independence (10% and 11% respectively). So, under the criteria of issues at stake, mediation 
efforts in the Cyprus conflict have a higher possibility of success. 
4.1.3 The Identity and Characteristics of the Mediator 
This variable has three dimensions which are impartiality of the mediator, his leverage 
and status. Among several combinations of these three variables, statistics show that an 
impartial mediator who is the leader of a government possessing rank, prestige and some 
leverage has a better chance of mediating successfully. Among mediation attempts by a 
mediator who fits to the description above, the success rate is 32%.  
When Kofi Annan was the mediator of the conflict in Cyprus in 2002, he was the 
Secretary General of the United Nations. He was neither a government leader nor president of 
a strong state but rather a spokesperson of the international community, or more specifically 
the United Nations. There is a general consensus that Kofi Annan himself, as a career 
diplomat in the UN was impartial during the mediation process. However, he was criticized of 
not knowing the realities and sensitive issues in Cyprus. He was considered as an impartial 
outsider to the conflict. Lastly, in terms of leverage, as the Secretary General of the UN, he is 
not considered as a mediator possessing much leverage to be put towards negotiations. He did 
not have carrots to award the parties if they were to reach an agreement or did not have sticks 
to punish them they were not. However, both sides continued the process in order to be seen 
as compatible with the UN. Although his impartiality was accepted by both sides, because 
Kofi Annan was not a government leader with rank and leverage, he did not fit the definition 
of a mediator who has the highest possibility of success in mediation. 
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4.2 Process Variable 
4.2.1 Strategies of the Mediator 
In the literature review part, three possible strategies of a mediator were named which 
were communication-facilitation (most passive), procedural and directive (most active). The 
more active strategies were the most effective ones in international mediation. Mediators 
using directive strategies, where they suggest new ways of seeing the dispute or alternate the 
motivational structure of the parties, have a success rate of 41%. An analysis of Kofi Annan’s 
strategies during the mediation process in Cyprus clearly demonstrates that he played a very 
active and directive role. In former UN mediation attempts, mediator used more passive ways 
such as ―good offices‖ or facilitation. They did not propose an agreement and their mediation 
had a limited scope. However, in the Kofi Annan case, the parties agreed that they would try 
to draft an agreement. If issues arise on which they could not agree, their motherlands (Turkey 
and Greece) would intervene to solve these issues. If, at the end, unresolved issues remained, 
Kofi Annan himself had the right to ―fill the gaps‖ in the agreement. So the draft agreement 
proposed to the parties, which is also known as the ―Annan Plan‖ was the product of active 
involvement of Kofi Annan. It can be said that in terms of mediator’s strategy, the Cyprus 
case falls under the category of directive strategy and is expected to have a higher possibility 
of success. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
ANALYSIS OF NORTHERN IRELAND 
 
5.1. Context Variables 
5.1.1. Characteristics of Parties  
5.1.1.1. Regime Type 
Regime type of Northern Ireland can be understood by looking at the number of Unionist 
and Republican political parties and history of recent election results. The Unionist, 
Republicans and other political parties can be listed as the following: 
TABLE 11. Political Parties in Northern Ireland 
Unionist Political Parties Republican Political Parties Other Political Parties 
British National Front Fianna Fail 
Alliance Party of Northern 
Ireland 
Democratic Unionist Party 
Irish Republican Socialist 
Party Communist Party of Ireland 
Progressive Unionist Party Republican Socialist Party Socialist Party 
Traditional Unionist Voice Republican Sinn Fein Socialist Workers Party 
Ulster Unionist Party Sinn Fein 
Green Party in Northern 
Ireland 
United Kingdom Independence 
Party 
Social Democratic and Labor 
Party 
Ulster Christian Democratic 
Party 
United Unionist Coalition   
Socialist Environmental 
Alliance 
    Workers’ Party of Ireland 
    Ulster Third Way 
 
To better understand the functioning of multi-party democracy, listing the results of 
recent elections is necessary. The results of legislative and parliamentary elections since 1998 
are: 
TABLE 12. 
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND 
ELECTION TO THE NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY, 25 JUNE 1998 
========================================================= 
Parties 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
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APNI - Alliance Party of Northern Ireland 
DUP - Democratic Unionist Party 
NIWC - Northern Ireland Women's Coalition 
PUP - Progressive Unionist Party 
SDLP - Social Democratic and Labour Party 
SF - Sinn Fein (Ourselves Alone) 
UKUP - United Kingdom Unionist Party 
UUP - Ulster Unionist Party 
PROVINCIAL SUMMARY 
========================================================= 
Party                                Votes    %     Seats 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Alliance Party of Nthn Ireland        52,636  06.5    6  
Democratic Unionist Party            145,917  18.0   20 
Nthn Ireland Women's Coalition        13,019  01.6    2  
Progressive Unionist Party            20,634  02.5    2  
Social Democratic and Labour Party   177,963  22.0   24  
Sinn Fein (Ourselves Alone)          142,858  17.6   18 
United Kingdom Unionist Party         36,541  04.5    5  
Ulster Unionist Party                172,225  21.3   28 
Others                                42,538  05.3    3 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Total                                804,331        108 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Total Unionist parties               375,317  46.7   55 
Total Nationalist parties            320,821  39.9   42 
Others                               108,193  13.4   11 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Total                                804,331        108 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
 
TABLE 13. 
 
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND 
ELECTION TO THE NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY, 26 NOVEMBER 2003 
===================================================================
====== 
Parties 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
APNI - Alliance Party of Northern Ireland 
DUP - Democratic Unionist Party 
NIWC - Northern Ireland Women's Coalition 
PUP - Progressive Unionist Party 
SDLP - Social Democratic and Labour Party 
SF - Sinn Fein (Ourselves Alone) 
UKUP - United Kingdom Unionist Party 
UUP - Ulster Unionist Party 
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PROVINCIAL SUMMARY 
===================================================================
====== 
Votes and seats are compared with those won at the 1998 elections 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Party                                Votes    %               Seats 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Alliance Party of Nthn Ireland        25,372  03.7 (-02.8)     6  ( 00) 
Democratic Unionist Party            177,944  25.7 (+07.7)    30  (+10) 
Nthn Ireland Women's Coalition         5,785  00.8 (-00.8)     -  (-02) 
Progressive Unionist Party             8,032  01.1 (-01.4)     1  (-01) 
Social Democratic and Labour Party   117,547  17.0 (-05.0)    18  (-06)  
Sinn Fein (Ourselves Alone)          162,758  23.5 (+05.9)    24  (+06) 
United Kingdom Unionist Party          5,700  00.8 (-03.7)     1  (-04) 
Ulster Unionist Party                156,931  22.7 (+01.4)    27  (-01)   
Others                                31,959  04.6             1  (-02) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Total                                692,028                 108 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Total Unionist parties               348,607  50.4 (+03.7)    59  (+01) 
Total Nationalist parties            280,305  40.5 (+00.6)    42  ( 00) 
Others                                63,116  09.1             7  (-01) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Total                                692,028                 108 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Number of political parties and elections results show that Northern Ireland has a multi-
party democracy as political system representing both unionist and republican parties to the 
conflict. As it was mentioned in quantitative analysis of Bercovitch, mediation between multi-
party democracies have 35% success rate. Northern Ireland case is under the category of 
mediation attempt within a multi-party democracy, which is expected to be more likely to 
create a successful mediation. 
5.1.1.2. Relative Power 
Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA): 
In the early to mid 1970s, the numbers recruited by the Provisional IRA may have 
reached several thousand, but these were reduced when the IRA re-organized its structures 
from 1977 onwards. An RUC report of 1986 estimated that the IRA had 300 or so members in 
Active Service Units and up to 750 active members in total in Northern Ireland. This does not 
take into consideration the IRA units in the Republic of Ireland or those in Britain, continental 
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Europe, and throughout the world. In 2005, the then Irish Minister for Justice, Equality and 
Law Reform, Michael McDowell told the Dáil that the organization had between 1,000 and 
1,500 active members. According to the book The Provisional IRA (Eamon Mallie and Patrick 
Bishop), roughly 8,000 people passed through the ranks of the IRA in the first 20 years of its 
existence. 
Ulster Defense Association (UDA): 
The Ulster Defense Association was formed in 1971 as an umbrella organization for 
the various Unionist factions in Northern Ireland. Such Unionist paramilitaries are militant 
groups committed to ensuring that Northern Ireland remains part of the United Kingdom.  
The UDA was formed to unite the disparate loyalist paramilitaries under one banner 
and institute a more uniform military training and command structure. The most notable of the 
paramilitary groups housed under the UDA are the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) and the 
Ulster Young Militants (UYM). Charles Smith was the first leader of the UDA. The UDA 
began with 40,000 members in 1972.  
TABLE 14. Armed Forces of United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland 
  Armed Forces of UK Armed Forces of R. of Ireland 
Armed forces personnel 212.000 (23rd of 166) 12.000 (104rd of 166) 
Army personnel 113.900 (21th of 49) 10.000 (132nd of 170)  
Armed forces growth minus 36 (106rd of 132) minus 16 (88rd of 132) 
Expenditure % of GDP 2.59% (26th of 145) 0.57% (110th of 145) 
Expenditure in dollar figure 42.836.500.000 (3th of 111) 700.000.000 (8th of 111) 
Manpower availability 14.877.700 (20th of 175) 1.024.635 (125th of 175) 
 
Figures show that unionist paramilitaries have a numerical advantage compare to 
republican paramilitaries. When the power of British army is compared with republican 
paramilitaries together with armed forces of Republic of Ireland, there is still a big power gap 
in favor of unionists. Statistics showed that mediation attempts where parties have roughly 
equal power was five times greater (32%) than between unequal states (6%).As the conflict in 
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Northern Ireland was between two parties with unequal power, it is expected that mediation 
attempts are more likely to fail. 
5.1.1.3. Previous Relations 
The history shows that the relation between Catholics and Protestants always had an 
antagonistic nature leading to several armed conflicts. The relation between Irish Catholics 
and Protestants has been unfriendly as well ever since the first Protestant settlements in 
Ireland.  
From the mid-16th and into the early 17th century, the British crown governments carried 
out a policy of land confiscation and colonization known as Plantations. Scottish and English 
Protestants were sent as colonists to the provinces of Munster, Ulster and the counties of 
Laois and Offaly. These Protestant settlers replaced the Irish Catholic landowners who were 
removed from their lands. The settlers would form the ruling class of future British 
administrations in Ireland. A series of Penal Laws discriminated against all faiths other than 
the established (Anglican) Church of Ireland. The principal victims of these laws were 
Catholics and later Presbyterians. The 17th century was perhaps the bloodiest in Ireland's 
history. Two periods of war (1641–53 and 1689–91) caused huge loss of life and resulted in 
the final dispossession of the Irish Catholic landowning class and their subordination under 
the Penal Laws. 
In September 1914, just as the First World War broke out, the UK Parliament finally 
passed the Third Home Rule Act to establish self-government for Ireland, but was suspended 
for the duration of the war. The period from 1916-1921 was marked by political violence and 
upheaval, ending in the partition of Ireland and independence for 26 of its 32 counties. A 
failed militant attempt was made to gain separate independence for Ireland with the 1916 
Easter Rising, an insurrection in Dublin. Though support for the insurgents was small, the 
violence used in its suppression led to a swing in support of the rebels. In addition, the 
unprecedented threat of Irishmen being conscripted to the British Army in 1918 (for service 
on the Western Front as a result of the German Spring Offensive) accelerated this change. In 
the December 1918 elections Sinn Féin, the party of the rebels, won a majority of three-
quarters of all seats in Ireland, twenty-seven MPs of which assembled in Dublin on 21 
January 1919, to form a thirty-two county Irish Republic parliament, the first Dáil Éireann 
unilaterally declaring sovereignty over the entire island. 
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Unwilling to negotiate any understanding with Britain short of complete independence, 
the Irish Republican Army — the army of the newly declared Irish Republic — waged a 
guerilla war (the Irish War of Independence) from 1919 to 1921. In the course of the fighting 
and amid much acrimony, the Fourth Government of Ireland Act 1920 implemented Home 
Rule while separating the island into what the British government's Act termed "Northern 
Ireland" and "Southern Ireland". In July 1921, the Irish and British governments agreed a 
truce that halted the war. In December 1921, representatives of both governments signed an 
Anglo-Irish Treaty. Under the Treaty, Northern Ireland could opt out of the Free State and 
stay within the United Kingdom: it promptly did so. For most of the next 75 years, each 
territory was strongly aligned to either Catholic or Protestant ideologies, although this was 
more marked in the six counties of Northern Ireland. 
History of Protestants and Catholics in Ireland shows that these two groups have always 
had antagonistic relations with several armed conflicts and violent actions. Therefore, the 
previous relations between parties of the conflict in Northern Ireland are not friendly. As the 
statistics show that 46% of the mediation attempts between parties with a history of friendship 
and cooperation are successful, it is expected that mediating in Northern Irish case to be 
unsuccessful. 
5.1.2. Nature of Dispute 
5.1.2.1. Duration 
There are different views on the date of the start of the Irish Troubles. Some says the civil 
rights march in Derry in 1968, others consider the deployment of British troops in 1969. As it 
formation of military groups were taking as the starting point of Cyprus conflict, it is better to 
take 1966 when Ulster Volunteer Force was formed as the start of conflict in Northern 
Ireland. From 1966 to 1995 when George Mitchell started to mediate in Northern Ireland 
conflict, it had duration of 29 years. As the highest possibility of success in mediation is 
expected to be between first and third month of a conflict, George Mitchell’s mediation in 
Northern Ireland happened much later than this time period. Therefore, under duration 
criteria, this mediation attempt is expected to be unsuccessful. 
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5.1.2.2. Intensity 
The number of fatalities during the troubles enables us to understand if the conflict in 
Northern Ireland was a high-intensity or low-intensity one. So the total number of casualties 
during the Northern Ireland conflict is calculates as 3466. The table below shows the total 
number of loses by communities.  
TABLE 15 
 
In this research, conflicts with over 1000 casualties are considered as high-intensity 
conflict. For this definition, the conflict in Northern Ireland is a high-intensity one. Statistical 
data shows that mediation affords in high-intensity conflicts have 17% of possibility to be 
successful while low-intensity conflicts have 42% success rate. Therefore, the mediation 
attempt in Northern Ireland is expected to be unsuccessful under this criteria.  
 
5.1.2.3. Issues 
As mentioned in the literature review part, a conflict can have one of the four major issues 
at stake which are sovereignty, ideology, security and independence. Conflicts where 
independence is the issue are usually about a country trying to gain independence from a 
colonizer. In Irish case, as Ireland gained its independence decades before the troubles started, 
the issue in Northern Ireland conflict cannot be classified as independence. As the conflict is 
mainly between two groups of Christianity, it has a value dimension. However, religion and 
values are mobilizing factors rather the main issues in Northern Ireland. Since the ideology 
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issue was defined as the difference in perception of the political system of a country, in 
Northern Ireland conflict, we cannot consider ideology as the major issue. Sovereignty was 
defined as incompatible claims to a specific piece of territory. In Northern Ireland, the main 
issue was that the republicans considered Northern Ireland as part of Ireland and wanted a 
unified Irish island. However, unionists in the north wanted to keep Northern Ireland 
independent from the rest of the island to have their own leadership in this part. So the issue 
was related to incompatible claims of two groups over the territories at the north part of the 
Irish island. In this sense, the conflict was related to security of Protestants in the North as 
they were the minority in whole Irish island who are afraid of a Catholic domination and it 
was also related to security of Catholics in the North as they were the minority in Northern 
Ireland who are afraid of Protestant discrimination. This analysis shows that major issues in 
Northern Ireland conflict are related sovereignty and security. As mediating in conflicts 
related to sovereignty and security have a higher possibility of success (23%and 27% 
respectively), mediation attempt in conflict in Northern Ireland is expected to be successful. 
5.1.3. The Identity and Characteristics of the Mediator 
When George Mitchell accepted Bill Clinton’s offer to mediate between parties in 
Northern Ireland, he was a senator of the United States. When Bill Clinton announced that he 
would put special efforts to solve the problem in Northern Ireland during his election 
campaign, he considered this issue as personal one. However, he did not choose to be the 
mediator in the conflict but sent George Mitchell for this special mission. In this sense, 
George Mitchell cannot be considered as a government leader but a special envoy of the US 
president. Although in the beginning of peace talks, some of the parties on the table did not 
accept him as the right mediator, the general opinion driven from the interviews was that he 
was an even-handed mediator. So he is said to be an impartial outsider to the conflict. Lastly, 
although he had full support of the US, he himself did not have so much leverage to offer to 
the parties. He was also not in a position to sanction the parties in case they would not reach 
an agreement. So in general, he was an impartial US senator with low level of leverage. 
Statistically, the highest percentage of success in international mediation belongs to impartial 
government leaders with prestige and some leverage. So George Mitchell as the mediator in 
Northern Ireland conflict did not fit in this category of mediators with the highest possibility 
of success. 
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5.2. Process Variable 
5.2.1. Strategies of the Mediator 
Among three possible strategies of a mediator which were communication-facilitation, 
procedural and directive, George Mitchell’s strategy in Northern Ireland conflict fits best to 
the definition of the latest for several reasons. First of all, he was very active in choosing who 
should be on the negotiation table. He wanted to have inclusive talks with all parties in 
Northern Ireland presented on the table. So he came up with an election strategy that the 
parties who should be on the table would be chosen by an election. However, he prepared 
such an election model that enabled even the smallest parties of Northern Ireland to be present 
at the table. So the negotiators were representing all sides, levels and political ideologies of 
Northern Ireland society. Another reason why he was so directive as a mediator is that instead 
of just facilitating the peace talks, he drafted an agreement with the help of Swedish and 
British and with the experiences of former agreements such as the Anglo-Irish agreement. So 
both in the structure and process of the peace talks, he deployed an active role which shows 
that he used directive strategies. Since statistically, mediators with directive strategies reach 
success in 41% of the case, George Mitchell as a directive mediator had a higher chance of 
success in mediating Northern Ireland conflict. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CROSS CASE CONCLUSIONS 
 
So far the mediation of Kofi Annan in Cyprus and George Mitchell in Northern Ireland 
were analyzed according to determinants of mediation success which were proposed by Jacob 
Bercovitch’s Contingency Model of Mediation. Eight hypotheses driven from his quantitative 
work 284 international mediation cases were tested in these two cases. In this part of the 
thesis, by looking at the results of analysis, some cross-case conclusions will be put forward. 
The aim of doing this cross-case analysis is to understand whether or not the determinants of 
success that Bercovitch put forward were enough to explain the success of George Mitchell 
and failure of Kofi Annan. In doing so, hypothesis related to each variable will be tested for 
both cases and results for eight hypotheses will be summarized with a table at the end. 
6.1 Context Variables 
6.1.1  Characteristics of the Parties 
6.1.1.1 Regime Types 
The hypothesis related to regime types was that ―mediation attempts involving two multi-
party states are more likely to be successful‖. When we analyzed Cyprus and Northern 
Ireland, the number of the parties and the recent election results in both cases proved that the 
parties in both cases have multi-party democracies. Therefore, as both mediation attempts 
involve multi-party states, they are expected to have a higher possibility of success. 
6.1.1.2 Relative Power 
The hypothesis related to relative power was that ―mediation attempts between states with 
roughly equal power are more likely to be successful‖. Analysis of conflicts in Cyprus and 
Northern Ireland showed that both conflicts were between parties with asymmetric power 
relations. In Cyprus case, during the Turkish intervention to the island in 1974 and the time 
period after the intervention, the Turkish Cypriots with the support of Turkish army has 
always been the stronger side in Cyprus in terms of military power. Armed forces of Turkish 
Cypriots together with Turkey compared to armed forces of Greek Cypriots together with 
Greece still have superiority, in terms of military power.  
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When the power relation in Northern Ireland is compared, the Unionist paramilitaries have 
a numerical advantage compared to republican paramilitaries. The power asymmetry is 
clearer when British armed forces in Northern Ireland are brought into the picture. Since 
British army was also fighting them, Republican paramilitaries were in a weakest position in 
terms of military power.  
At the final analysis, mediation affords in both cases were between parties with 
asymmetric power relations. Therefore, mediation initiatives are expected to have a low 
possibility of success. 
6.1.1.3 Previous Relations 
The hypothesis related to history of relations between parties was that ―mediation attempts 
between states with a history of friendship are more likely to be successful‖. When the history 
of relations between Greeks and Turks was analyzed, we saw that two nations had been 
enemies since the Ottoman and Byzantine Empire times. These two nations fought major wars 
during the Balkan Wars and the First World War. During the modern history of Greece and 
Turkey, these two states had several incompatible issues and the tension between them 
reached to the levels where two countries were about to go into war. The relation between 
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots was also antagonistic from time to time since the 
invasion of Cyprus by Ottomans in1571. Even before Turkish intervention in 1974, there were 
violent actions between two groups on the island. Therefore, the previous relations between 
parties in Cyprus conflict clearly have an antagonistic nature.  
The analysis of history of relations in Northern Ireland conflict started with the history of 
relations between Catholics and Protestants as this was the main mobilizing factor in the 
conflict. Several wars in Europe were fought between Catholics and Protestants, among which 
the Thirty Years War was the most devastating one. When we focused on the relation between 
Catholics and Protestants in island of Ireland, the relations had always been unfriendly 
between two groups since the first Protestant settlers reached to the island. Therefore, it is also 
clear in Northern Ireland case that the parties have a history of antagonistic relations.  
In both of the cases, the mediation attempts were between parties with history of bad 
relations, so they were expected to be unsuccessful. 
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6.1.2 Nature of  the Dispute 
6.1.2.1 Duration 
The hypothesis related to timing of the mediation was that ―mediation attempts taking 
place one to three months into a dispute are more likely to be successful‖. In Cyprus case the 
formation the National Organization of Cypriot Combatants (EOKA) in 1955 and its attacks 
on Turkish Cypriots was taken as the starting point of the conflict. By the time Kofi Annan 
started his mediation in 2002, the conflict already had a history of 47 years. Similarly, the 
beginning of the conflict in Northern Ireland was considered as the formation of Ulster 
Volunteer Force in 1966. When George Mitchell intervened as the mediator in 1995, the 
conflict already had a history of 29 years. Both of the mediation attempts were much later 
than the optimum timing that was proposed in the hypothesis. Therefore, their mediations are 
expected to have a lower possibility of success. 
6.1.2.2 Intensity 
The hypothesis related to intensity was that ―mediation attempts in low-intensity disputes 
are more likely to be successful‖. Here ―low-intensity‖ was defined as conflicts with fatalities 
of 500 to 1000. When the number of fatalities in Cyprus conflict is analyzed, only during the 
Turkish intervention on the island, a total of approximately 5000 people lost their lives and 
15.000 people were wounded. In Northern Ireland, only during the troubles, over 3000 people 
were killed by the republican and unionist paramilitaries, as well as the British army. As we 
defined intensity purely by looking at the number of fatalities, both conflicts are high-
intensity conflicts. Therefore, mediating in these two cases are expected to be unsuccessful. 
6.1.2.3 Issues 
The hypothesis related to the issues was that ―mediation attempts in conflict where 
sovereignty or security are the basic issues are more likely to be successful‖. Among four 
types of issues which were sovereignty, ideology, security and independence, the conflict in 
Cyprus is mostly about sovereignty and security. Whether there should be one sovereignty 
representing whole island or two sovereignties representing each group and if there is one 
sovereignty which group should take more role in it were the major issues in Cyprus conflict. 
Recent polls also showed that Cypriots of both communities see security as the main issue in 
the conflict. Isolation makes Turkish Cypriots feel insecure about their future and current 
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Turkish troops on the island and another possible intervention make Greek Cypriots feel 
unsecure.  
Similarly, the conflict in Northern Ireland is mostly related to the status of the territory in 
North part of Ireland Island. The issue of whether it should unite with the rest of Ireland or 
stay as a part of the United Kingdom is entirely related to sovereignty over these territories. 
As Protestants feel unsecure as the minority in whole island of Ireland and as Catholics feel 
unsecure as the minority in Northern Ireland, security becomes a major issue of the conflict.  
Analysis shows that the main issues in both conflicts are related to sovereignty and 
security. Therefore mediating in these cases has a higher possibility of success according to 
this hypothesis. 
6.1.3 The Identity and Characteristics of the Mediator 
The hypothesis related to the identity and characteristics of the mediator was that 
―mediation attempts by impartial government leaders, possessing rank and prestige with some 
leverage are more likely to be successful‖. The cases were analyzed under three variables 
which were status, impartiality and leverage of the mediators. In Cyprus case, Kofi Annan as 
Secretary General of the United Nations was an impartial mediator with low leverage. In 
Northern Ireland, George Mitchell as a United States senator was also an impartial mediator 
with low leverage. Both of the mediators did not fit to the definition of mediator with highest 
possibility of success. Therefore, mediation efforts in both cases are expected to have a lower 
possibility of success. 
6.2 Process Variable 
6.2.1.  Strategies of the Mediator 
The hypothesis related to the strategies of the mediator was that ―mediation attempts with 
directive strategies of the mediator are more likely to be successful‖. The possible strategies 
of a mediator were classified under three categories which were communication-facilitation, 
procedural and directive. When the strategies of Kofi Annan in mediating Cyprus conflict are 
analyzed, it is clearly seen that he played an active role which is considered as directive 
strategies. His shuttle diplomacy between parties and taking individual initiative in filling the 
gaps in draft agreement and proposing it to the parties with the name of ―Annan Plan‖ are 
examples of his active strategy.  
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George Mitchell, in mediating Northern Ireland conflict, was also an active mediator with 
directive strategies. His important role in election of parties to the table and similar to Kofi 
Annan, taking individual initiative in drafting the agreement are examples of this active 
strategy. Since the hypothesis proposes that mediators with directive strategies have a better 
chance of success in international mediation, both mediators, with their active strategies, had 
a high chance of being successful. 
When cases are analyzed and compared under these eight hypotheses, an interesting cross-
case conclusion is reached which is summarized in the following table. Mediation efforts and 
the mediators in both the Cyprus case and the Northern Ireland case comply with three of the 
eight hypotheses. In Cyprus case three variables which are regime types, issues and strategies 
of the mediator comply with highest possibility of success. In the other five variables which 
are relative power, previous relations, duration, intensity and the identity of the mediator 
Cyprus case is under the category of lower possibility of success. The mediation effort in 
Northern Ireland also complies with highest possibility of success in three variables and with 
lower possibility of success in five variables. The most interesting finding is that the variables 
that match with highest possibility of success and lower possibility of success are the same 
variables for both of the cases. In other words, when we give ―yes‖ and ―no‖ according to 
compliance with the highest possibility of success, both of the cases get three ―yes‖ and five 
―no‖ on same variables. 
TABLE 16. Cross-Case Conclusions 
Eight Hypothesis Cyprus Northern Ireland 
Multi Party Democracy YES YES 
Roughly Equal Power NO NO 
History of Friendship NO NO 
Intervention in One to Three Months NO NO 
Low Intensity NO NO 
Territory and Security Issues YES YES 
Government Leader with Leverage NO NO 
Directive Strategies of Mediator YES YES 
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According to the analysis of these two cases under the determinants of success put 
forward by Bercovitch, theoretically both of the mediation attempts are expected to fail. 
However, in reality while Kofi Annan’s attempt was unsuccessful in Cyprus, George 
Mitchell’s attempt was successful in Northern Ireland. Therefore the conclusion is that the 
outcomes of international mediation efforts of Kofi Annan in Cyprus and George Mitchell in 
Northern Ireland cannot be explained by context and process variables of Contingency Model 
of Mediation and quantitative conclusions of Jacob Bercovitch.  
During the data collection part of the research, variables other than those proposed by 
the model are also tried to be discovered. Analysis of the documents and interview results 
showed other factors which affected the result of the mediation attempts. Additional three 
context variables and two process variables, which had dramatic effects on success and failure 
of the cases, were found.  
To start with additional context variables, the intensity of international pressure played 
an important role on the outcome of two mediations. The US president Bill Clinton gave 
promises to American citizens of Irish origin that he will put efforts in solving the conflict in 
Northern Ireland. Therefore, after he got elected as the president, he considered Northern 
Ireland issue as a personal one and pressured the parties to find a solution to the conflict. With 
this aim, he sent George Mitchell as the mediator to the conflict. The US was not the only 
international actor which was pressuring for a solution. The EU was also pushing for a 
solution as it finds such a conflict within the EU territories shameful and contradictory to the 
basic values of the union. Together with the pressure, the EU also invested considerable 
amount of funds to the peace process in Northern Ireland. However, when we look at the 
Cyprus conflict, we do not see any pressure from strong states of the international community. 
Although this conflict was also within the European territories, the EU did not pressure and 
invest enough to make parties reach a solution. By declaring that Republic of Cyprus will 
become a member of the EU on May 2004 even if it does not find a solution to its border 
problem with the North, the EU even played a destructive role in the peace process. If the EU 
had used its ―carrot‖ which is the membership more wisely, the mediation affords of Kofi 
Annan could have ended differently. So international pressure was high in Northern Ireland, it 
was relatively low in Cyprus.  
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Another additional context variable is the involvement of civil society in the peace 
process.  In Northern Ireland, the number of peace projects at grassroots level and the number 
of NGOs operating in this area was much higher than those in Cyprus. The amount of the EU 
funds available for such projects in Northern Ireland made it easier to support the formal 
efforts with efforts at grassroots level. Although there were informal initiatives in Cyprus 
mostly by foreign academic, the grassroots level peace initiatives were relatively weak. The 
grassroots projects in Northern Ireland prepared a positive public opinion to a solution. So the 
number of informal initiatives was high in Northern Ireland and relatively low in Cyprus. 
Yet another additional context variable is language which was repeatedly emphasized 
during the interviews. In Northern Ireland, both parties’ and the mediator’s native language 
was English. That played a crucial role in facilitating the communication and decreasing the 
misunderstandings. At grassroots level, speaking the same language increased the chance of 
social interactions between two communities. However, in Cyprus case, Turkish side is 
speaking in Turkish, Greek side is speaking in Greek and as a diplomat from Gana, Kofi 
Annan was speaking in English. Therefore, the mediation process continued with the help of 
interpreters, which made it more possible for misunderstandings. Moreover, since two 
communities speak different language, the interactions between them were also limited. So 
language played a facilitating role in Northern Ireland, but a destructive role in Cyprus. 
Secondly, two additional process variables were found, first of which is the nature of 
the peace talks. In Cyprus, Kofi Annan was mediating between presidents of Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots. Since in both communities presidents are elected, they represent their 
constituencies. So in peace talks the opposition leaders and their constituencies were not 
represented. This exclusive nature of the peace talks in Cyprus played a negative role during 
the referenda for Annan Plan. However, in Northern Ireland, George Mitchell came up with a 
formula which enabled even smaller parties to have representatives on negotiation table. Not 
only main unionist and republican parties but also neutral parties such Alliance party or small 
parties such as Women’s Coalition were present on the table. This inclusive nature of peace 
talks played an important role in getting a high percentage of ―YES‖ votes for the agreement. 
So exclusive nature of Cyprus negotiations, and inclusive nature of Northern Ireland 
negotiations made a crucial impact on the result of the mediation attempts. 
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The second additional process variable is the role of leaders during the negotiations 
and referenda. In Northern Ireland, after inclusive negotiations, almost all parties on the table 
reached a consensus on the draft agreement which would be put on a referenda. Since the 
agreement was mutually created and satisfactory for all parties, each of them made a ―YES‖ 
campaign before the voting. However, in Cyprus, the leaders of the two communities were not 
satisfied with the agreement from the beginning. Since neither of them wanted to be seen as 
deal-breaker in the eyes of international community, they both agreed the terms of the 
agreement. Contradictory to what they agree on table, both leaders started a ―NO‖ campaign 
before the referenda. Although the ―NO‖ campaign of the Turkish leader was not success, 
since majority of the Turkish community voted for the agreement, it had a negative impact on 
votes of the Greek community who voted ―NO‖ to the agreement. So in Northern Ireland the 
leaders played a constructive role in affecting the public vote for the agreement, while in 
Cyprus the leaders played a destructive role with their ―NO‖ campaigns.  
The following chart summarizes the differences in additional context and process 
variables which are considered as a better explanation for success and failure of the mediation 
attempts in Cyprus and Northern Ireland. 
TABLE 17. Additional Variables 
Context Variables: Cyprus Northern Ireland 
International Pressure Relatively Low Relatively High 
Informal Peace Initiatives Relatively Low Relatively High 
Language Different Same 
Process Variables:     
Nature of the Peace Talks Exclusive Inclusive 
Role of the Leaders Destructive Constructive 
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CONCLUSION 
The aim of this research was to find the answer to the question of ―what are the 
determinants of the success and failure in international mediation?‖ By examining the 
mediation efforts of Kofi Annan in Cyprus conflict and George Mitchell in Northern Ireland 
conflict, the effects of context and process variables on outcome of mediation were tried to be 
understood.  
In doing so, the determinants in Jacob Bercovitch’s Contingency Model of Mediation 
were taken as independent variables. Eight hypotheses related to context variables (nature of 
parties, nature of dispute and nature of mediator) and process variable (strategies of the 
mediator) were tested on two cases. With the light of data collected by three different methods 
(documentary information, interviews and direct observation), the cases were examined to 
understand whether or not they are in line with the eight hypothesis. At the end, it was found 
that each case falls under the category of high percentage of success in three hypotheses 
which are ―multi party democracies‖, ―territory and security issues‖ and ―directive strategies 
of the mediator‖. Under remaining five hypotheses, the cases fall under the category of low 
percentage of success. From this analysis, it was concluded that theoretically both mediations 
attempts should have been unsuccessful. However, in reality Cyprus case was a failure while 
Northern Ireland case was a success.  
During the data collection part of the research, possible determinants other than those 
proposed by Bercovitch were also tried to be discovered. At the end of the research, those 
additional factors better explained the results of the mediations. Low level of international 
pressure, low number of informal initiatives, different languages, exclusive nature of the 
peace talks and destructive role of the leaders made a crucial impact in unsuccessful outcome 
of Kofi Annan’s mediation in Cyprus. On the other hand, high level of international pressure, 
high number of informal initiatives, same language, inclusive nature of the peace talks and 
constructive role of the leaders made a positive impact on successful outcome of George 
Mitchell’s mediation in Northern Ireland.  
Finally, it can be said that by examining two cases, because of the complex nature of 
international mediation, hypothesis of Jacob Bercovitch and the variables in his Contingency 
Model is not sufficient to explain the success or failure of a mediation attempt. Additional 
context and process variables should also be examined in order to have a better understanding 
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of the outcome of an international mediation attempt. As a future research proposal, the 
additional variables proposed in this research should be examined on other cases of 
international mediation. An increase in the number of case specific researches will enable us 
to have better understanding of determinants of success in international mediation. 
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